The Position on The Baghdad Pact Through the Memoirs of Jordanian Politicians

Abstract

The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was a regional alliance that shaped geopolitics and polarised the Arab world. Jordan had to balance pressure from Egypt, Iraq, and Britain during their difficult internal policy discussions over the agreement. This study utilized primary source memoirs from senior Jordanian politicians involved in decision-making under two governments to fill literature gaps and offer fresh insights into Jordan's internal decision-making process during a pivotal period. The study findings revealed the great majesty King Hussein achieved significant success in various fields, leading Jordan to break away from the British control in the Jordanian-British treaty. However, the British government postponed this until a defense alliance was established in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, a defunct military alliance consisting of Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, aimed to counter communism in the region. Britain exerted significant pressure on Jordan to join this alliance. Overall, Jordan's decision to join the Baghdad Pact was divided into two parts: one that believed it provided economic and military aid, and the other that saw it as a colonial ploy. The study presents personal notes of Jordanian politicians, who expressed their views on the alliance, either rejecting it or accepting it, highlighting the potential dangers of the eastern camp, which Jordan has no interest in. In essence, this study fulfilled understanding of Jordan's internal political process in navigating regional realignments, filling gaps in its decision-making process through analysis of high-level primary sources.