



Reason Why We Do Care of Future Generations: Theory of Justice in the Anthropocene

Dr. Yoochul Lee

Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University
uchul83@gmail.com, yoochul.lee@snu.ac.kr
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3952-4878>

Abstract

This paper evaluates the relevance of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* in addressing justice within the Anthropocene, focusing on climate change. The Anthropocene marks a period of significant human impact on ecosystems, highlighted by the Trinity Test and the Great Acceleration. The study examines three policy paths: sustainable development, a steady-state economy, and degrowth. While Rawls's influence on political theory is undeniable, critiques by Katrina Forrester suggest his framework may overlook crucial issues like power dynamics. This paper argues for the continued relevance of Rawls's focus on moral psychology and motivation, particularly in intergenerational justice. It narrows the scope to motivations for caring about future generations and reassesses Rawls's assumptions about economic growth. Through the concept of "theodicy of difference," it challenges the notion that Rawls presupposed growth, ultimately supporting the applicability of his theory in contemporary environmental discussions.

Keywords: Theory of Justice, Anthropocene, Rawlsianism, Justice, Genealogy of Norms

Received: 03 October 2023 **Revised:** 15 November 2023 **Accepted:** 06 December 2023

I. Introduction: A Theory of Justice in the Anthropocene

The term Anthropocene refers to a geological epoch in which human activities have significantly influenced ecosystems. Although the word existed previously, it gained widespread attention in 2000 when atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen employed it. There are various theories regarding the beginning of the Anthropocene, but in recent years, the Trinity Test, the first nuclear test in July 1945, has been increasingly recognized as a pivotal point. Additionally, there is consensus that the period of remarkable economic growth and population increase in the latter half of the 20th century, known as the Great Acceleration, has led to dramatic changes in the Earth's environment.

Among the environmental crises of the Anthropocene, this paper will focus on "climate change." Various arguments have been presented on this issue, but according to Makoto Chiba, three distinct policy paths or goals can be identified: 1) sustainable development, 2) a steady-state economy, and 3) degrowth.

1. **Sustainable Development** is the stance that seeks to reconcile overcoming global warming with economic growth. The Green New Deal and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are categorized under this perspective, as they aim for economic growth while considering environmental concerns. This view likely has the most supporters. However, precisely because of this, there are significant differences of opinion regarding the means of achieving it, even though they share common challenges such as the target values for greenhouse gas reduction. For example, some people consider nuclear power effective, while others emphasize its problems.

2. **Steady-State Economy** does not prioritize quantitative GDP expansion but rather aims for qualitative societal development. H.E. Daly, a representative theorist, refers to Mill's "Principles of Political Economy" for the steady-state theory and advocates for an ecologically sustainable society and an improved lifestyle suitable for it (Daly, 1997). Although it actively affirms the social metabolism, it takes a skeptical stance towards continuous economic growth.
3. **Degrowth** shares many aspects with the steady-state economy but is more critical of sustainable development. Serge Latouche, a representative theorist, criticizes the ideology of economic growth, including sustainable development, through his concept of "decroissance," meaning "degrowth" in French (Latouche, 2010). According to Latouche, even the steady-state economy cannot escape from such ideologies. This is arguably the most radical view among the three.

In the Anglo-American normative political theory, John Dryzek, known for his work on deliberative democracy and environmental justice, published "The Politics of the Anthropocene" in collaboration with Jonathan Pickering in 2019. In the field of climate justice, Henry Shue's 1993 seminal paper on "subsistence emissions and luxury emissions" is well-known. It is expected that research on normative theory focusing on the issues of the Anthropocene will increase in the future (Dryzek et al., 2019, Shue, 1993).

Both Dryzek and Shue, who began their careers around the 1970s, were significantly influenced by John Rawls's "A Theory of Justice." There is no doubt that "A Theory of Justice" was a watershed in the development of normative approaches known as analytical political philosophy and applied political philosophy. They indeed share the Rawlsian paradigm. Many contemporary normative political theories can also be said to be under the influence of "A Theory of Justice(hereafter *TJ*)" in some way.

While Rawls's contribution was immense, was it truly desirable? While his theory sparked an industry, did it not lead to a tendency to overlook critical aspects of real-world politics? In "In The Shadow of Justice(hereafter *ISJ*)" (2019), Katrina Forrester raises this ambitious question through extensive research, including the Rawls Archive. This work immediately generated significant responses .

Through the historical formation and reception of normative theory in the latter half of the 20th century centered around "A Theory of Justice," she provides a negative evaluation of the Rawlsian paradigm. Namely, "A Theory of Justice," which assumes an idealized American civil society of the 1950s-60s, heavily relies on morality and consensus-seeking, inclined to downplay traditional political science categories such as domination and power (Forrester, 2019). As a result, it carries a bias towards maintaining the status quo.

Moreover, this characteristic is inherited by contemporary normative political theory in general, including Rawls's critics. "The Rawlsian framework has come to function as a constraint on what kinds of theorizing can be done and what kinds of politics can be imagined" (ISJ 275). Despite new issues arising, such as climate change, contemporary normative political theory has yet to break free from the shadow of "A Theory of Justice."

"In The Shadow of Justice" attempts to historicize and relativize the Rawlsian paradigm through the genealogy of normative theory (Forrester, 2019). However, due to its ambitious nature and its focus on relatively recent history, the narrative tends to be sweeping. This paper will later point out that there is room for questioning the story she presents.

To summarize the above discussion: On one hand, there is a need for a new theory of justice concerning the Anthropocene (particularly climate change), and on the other hand, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of "A Theory of Justice." The problem setting of this paper is derived from connecting these two recent important research trends. Namely, "Can 'A Theory of Justice' still be effective in considering a theory of justice for the Anthropocene?" I would like to provide an affirmative answer to this question,

particularly emphasizing that "A Theory of Justice" prioritized issues of moral psychology (motivation).¹

However, addressing climate change and re-examining "A Theory of Justice" are significant themes that cannot be fully covered in a single discussion. Therefore, this paper will limit the discussion as follows: First, concerning climate change, the focus will be on motivation rather than rules and institutions. In other words, instead of asking "What are the rules or institutions consistent with climate justice?", this paper will explore "Why do we care about future generations?"² Next, regarding "A Theory of Justice," the focus will be on intergenerational justice, particularly examining the "optimistic assumptions about economic growth" criticized by Forrester and others. The discussion will proceed in reverse order: after re-examining "A Theory of Justice," it will explore the reasons for considering future generations.

The structure is as follows: First, Forrester's argument is organized in line with intergenerational justice (Section 2). Next, her critique that "A Theory of Justice" presupposes excessive economic growth is addressed, responding that it is unconvincing (Section 3). Furthermore, from concerns related to Forrester, an alternative concept of "theodicy of difference" is proposed against S. Eich, who likens Rawls's thought to "theodicy of growth" (Section 4). In my interpretation, "A Theory of Justice" does not presuppose remarkable economic growth, and the underlying notion is "difference," not "growth." Based on these considerations, as a positive argument derivable from Rawls's theory, reasons for considering future generations are examined with reference to S. Scheffler (Section 5). Finally, conclusions and challenges are discussed.

II. Genealogy of Contemporary Normative Theory: *In the Shadow of Justice*

In the Shadow of Justice can be regarded as the first comprehensive historical account of normative political theory. It constructs a narrative as a history of issues, beginning with the intellectual formation of a young John Rawls, passing through the establishment of *A Theory of Justice* in 1971, and extending into the 21st century. The book covers representative theorists and themes, and the insights and perspectives it presents are highly commendable.

First, though it may be a lengthy citation, I would like to confirm the conclusion. Forrester's evaluation of what *A Theory of Justice* brought about is a negative one:

"Politics is in the midst of change. The battles with unaccountable financial institutions, new media platforms, technological changes, and climate change—fighting radical dissent and new oligarchic forces—demonstrate this well. Liberal philosophers have some tools to deal with these new changes. However, our questions require a new framework. It must be distinct from the framework created during a period of ideological conflict vastly different from our own. Perhaps the time has come to treat the philosophical liberalism that dominated the latter half of the 20th century as one of many doctrines rather than the primary resource for political philosophers. And to understand Rawls's theory as an independent chapter in the history of political thought, for it is both our available past and, like all political theory, a product of its time" (ISJ 279).

There indeed was a time when *A Theory of Justice* was timely. But has it not become a thing of the past? Forrester attempts to demonstrate this claim across various themes, but this paper will confine itself to the

¹ Moral psychology is the subject of the third part of *A Theory of Justice*, and it was a topic Rawls himself was most interested in, though it has not received much attention. Even in *In the Shadow of Justice*, while it is briefly addressed in the first chapter, "The Making of Justice," which traces the formation of young Rawls's thought, it is largely ignored thereafter. This omission in a book that covers such a wide range of issues might be telling considering the reception process of *A Theory of Justice*. Forrester, Katrina (2019) *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy*. New York: Princeton University Press.

² The first and second parts of *A Theory of Justice* examine just rules and institutions, but this question corresponds to that of the third part: why adhering to justice is also good.

issues related to "climate change." How did liberal political philosophy perceive issues of population and the environment? Chapter six of *In the Shadow of Justice*, titled "Future Problems," addresses this issue. In this section, I will organize Forrester's discussion and point out its issues in the next section.

The main point is this: *A Theory of Justice* appeared plausible due to the assumption of exceptional and unprecedented economic growth over the two decades following World War II. However, this condition was becoming obsolete at the very moment *A Theory of Justice* was published. Despite this, liberal political philosophers following in Rawls's footsteps were largely unaware of this and thus became detached from reality.

This assessment certainly holds some validity. However, as we will see, the criticism that the social and economic conditions assumed by *A Theory of Justice* were extraordinarily affluent is not particularly convincing. Nonetheless, Forrester's observations prompt a re-examination of the conditions for intergenerational justice and distributive justice, which is beneficial in this regard.

It is worth noting that in *In the Shadow of Justice*, chapter six, "Future Problems," is a section where the presence of Rawls or *A Theory of Justice* is relatively weak. Rather, the main focus is on Derek Parfit and his *Reasons and Persons* (1984). Parfit held a seminar on population ethics at Oxford in 1971, which eventually led to today's intergenerational justice theory. Parfit, then in his late twenties, wrote to Rawls, stating, "The more I think about population policy, the more perplexed I become by this topic" (ISJ 186-187).

In fact, Rawls's treatment in this chapter remains as a prelude to Parfit. It is true that section 44 of *A Theory of Justice*, "The Problem of Justice Between Generations," contains an important discussion on the "just savings principle." However, it is said to be a borrowing from the economic growth theory of the time, represented by Robert Solow, and is not considered particularly original (ISJ 178).

To explain briefly, the savings principle is a principle that regulates the wealth the current generation should leave for the next to realize a just society across generations. It is not just to consider only one's own generation.³ Even if there are unfortunate people in the same generation, we must also be concerned about future generations. However, if a completely just society were established as a stock, the savings principle would no longer be necessary. "The just savings principle can be viewed as an understanding between generations about the fair sharing of the burdens of realizing and maintaining a just society. The end of the saving process [= realization of a just society] is pre-set, although only its broad outlines are known. Details will be determined by the individual circumstances that arise over time. But in any case, we are not bound to continue maximizing [total utility through saving] indefinitely" (TJ §44, 257-389).

It is certain that Rawls did not assume limitless growth. However, Forrester criticizes this view of the future as overly optimistic. "Rawls assumed that things would gradually improve. Growth would continue. With some improvements, justice could be achieved. / Such assumptions underpinning *A Theory of Justice* were made possible by the exceptional and unprecedented economic growth that characterized the postwar period" (ISJ 180).

It is widely accepted that the two-decade liberal consensus era following the war was the golden age of the welfare state. To borrow Samuel Moyn's expression, *A Theory of Justice* might be considered the swan song of social welfare in the United States (Moyn, 2018: 147).⁴ However, even if Rawls assumed growth, whether it can be equated with "exceptional and unprecedented economic growth" remains to be examined later.

Returning to Parfit, Rawls's optimistic assumptions were immediately challenged by reality because the

³ Therefore, the savings principle constrains the difference principle. The savings principle is necessary during the transition period, and in this respect, it is analogous to the duty of assistance in *The Law of Peoples*.

⁴ Moyn also raises the critique that *A Theory of Justice* might have had a negative impact on the status quo bias of the postwar international order (particularly its economic aspects).

early 1970s were when environmental and population issues became widely recognized as social problems. In 1962, Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* heightened interest in environmental protection in the United States. Furthermore, "The Limits to Growth," published by the Club of Rome in 1972, sparked worldwide reactions.

Parfit was the figure who faced these issues and made breakthroughs in the field of philosophy and normative theory. His contributions to normative political and moral theory are immense. His style, employing bold thought experiments, also had a significant influence on future generations. The puzzles posed in *Reasons and Persons*, such as the "repugnant conclusion" and the "non-identity problem," became the foundation of subsequent debates (Parfit, 1986: ch. 16, 17).

However, Forrester is also critical of Parfit. He became more detached from reality than Rawls, abstracting ethics. Ultimately, this encouraged a tendency for philosophy to evade political debate. The same goes for their followers. However, Forrester evaluates Onora O'Neill and Brian Barry as exceptional theorists who maintained sensitivity to reality (ISJ 191-200).

I would like to examine Barry's arguments related to the problem setting of this paper.⁵ In his 1977 paper "Justice Between Generations," he argued that political theory should incorporate an ecological perspective (Barry, 1977). We should be stewards, not owners, of the Earth, with at least the obligation not to pass on a deteriorated environment to future generations. The savings principle in *A Theory of Justice* tends to reduce intergenerational relations to those between one generation and its successors, overlooking long-term harm to distant future generations.

Rawls's optimistic assumptions about growth may have blinded him to long-term issues. Barry's 1978 paper "Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations" delves deeper into this criticism. "Circumstances of justice" is a technical term in *A Theory of Justice*, referring to a set of conditions under which distributive justice becomes necessary and possible (Barry, 1978). Subjective conditions include a degree of concordance and competition among people's interests and needs, while objective conditions include the absence of vast disparities in people's intellectual and physical abilities, and the scarcity of goods, drawing on Hume's moral philosophy (TJ§22).

Barry criticizes the last condition mentioned, "the scarcity of goods." According to Rawls, the world is neither a haven where one can live without doing anything nor a barren land. By increasing goods through cooperation, one can lead a sufficient life. Thus, the idea of distributive justice becomes meaningful. However, Barry argues that this is not a self-evident condition. Simply put, Rawls excludes conditions of deprivation. "To Barry, Rawls's narrowness seemed deep-rooted. The background conditions of a just society he described were provided only by the wealthy postwar United States. Accepting the 'subterranean' Humean circumstances as a necessary condition of justice ultimately makes the future too desolate. The clause of moderate scarcity should be removed, not because the future is uncertain, but because it locks Rawls's idea of justice (like Hume's) into the rules of private property" (ISJ p.199).

According to Barry, normative considerations about the future should also include setting criteria for who should gain what under conditions of scarcity. Of course, the risk of creating such situations should itself be reduced. In other words, the demands of justice should be considered from the perspective of prohibiting the reduction of the opportunity set for future generations due to the present generation's wastefulness, rather than improving the living conditions of future generations through the actions of the present generation. If the denial of options for future generations actually occurs, it must be compensated. Regarding intergenerational justice, it can be said that Rawls thought in terms of addition, while Barry

⁵ In *In the Shadow of Justice*, nearly all are subjects of critique, not only liberal theorists in the Rawlsian line but also communitarians who attempted to counter it. Both supporters and critics of Rawls share a focus on moral questions, which tended to overlook important issues such as "political domination, collective agency, and institutional power mechanisms" (ISJ 268). In this context, Barry receives an exceptionally favorable evaluation, including his treatment in chapter five, which focuses on global justice (ISJ 159-166). Incidentally, O'Neill's discussion concerns population policy related to famine.

thought in terms of subtraction.

III. *A Theory of Justice* and Economic Growth

The above summarizes Forrester's critique of *A Theory of Justice*, particularly regarding intergenerational justice. I will now reorganize the discussion and respond by summarizing the main points into three areas:

A) *A Theory of Justice* presupposes the exceptional economic growth of the twenty years following World War II and is therefore not useful for future intergenerational justice (and by extension, distributive justice).

B) *A Theory of Justice* assumes economic growth and is not useful for future intergenerational justice (and by extension, distributive justice).

C) *A Theory of Justice* is filled with puzzle-solving moral theories that divert attention from real politics.

In the following, I will primarily respond to points A and B. In this section, I will first address the stronger critique, A. Regarding B, the next section will present the outlook that *A Theory of Justice* can be interpreted from the perspective of "difference" rather than "growth".⁶

Let us re-examine Forrester's text: "Such assumptions underpinning *A Theory of Justice* were made possible by the exceptional, unprecedented economic growth characterizing the postwar period" (ISJ 180). It is likely true that Rawls's theory assumed economic growth. Indeed, for about twenty years postwar, advanced countries enjoyed an average economic growth rate of around 5%. However, is it truly impossible to sustain the conceptions in *A Theory of Justice* without such substantial growth?

Forrester's argument contains some ambiguity. While it is clear that she has the liberal consensus in mind, two distinctions can be made regarding what constituted "exceptional, unprecedented economic growth":

1. A stable economic growth rate of about 5% was "exceptional and unprecedented."
2. The economic growth necessary for the establishment and maintenance of the welfare state was "exceptional and unprecedented."

Although Forrester does not elaborate, she seems to assume that without 1, 2 cannot be realized, as indicated by her reference to the legitimacy crisis of the welfare state (ISJ 203). Indeed, in many societies, such a scenario appeared to unfold. However, this connection is not inevitable. For instance, as a review of *In the Shadow of Justice* aptly points out, the success of the welfare state in Scandinavian countries is not solely linked to the economic growth of the two decades following the war (Kugelberg, 2020). In theory, 1 and 2 are separable.

While 1 might be a challenging assumption going forward, 2 is not necessarily "exceptional and unprecedented." Societies with functioning welfare systems exist even with slower growth rates. While greater economic growth is preferable, as welfare regime theory suggests, the relationships among various actors and the nature of political culture are more critical. Rawls supported not a "welfare-state capitalism" that assumes clientelism in exchange for high growth rates, but a "property-owning democracy" that encourages active political participation and social inclusion.⁷

While *A Theory of Justice* does not deny the significance of economic growth, it does not contain discussions that rely on the expectation of increased production capacity or continued growth. In discussing

⁶ Regarding C, I believe that the use of thought experiments is beneficial for normative theory. In section five, I would like to favorably discuss Scheffler's examination using thought experiments.

⁷ Although Rawls himself does not actively use the term "welfare state," in this paper, it is intended to be compatible with a property-owning democracy. It is sufficient to keep in mind an institutional configuration similar to a social democratic regime.

intergenerational justice, there are even passages where it is explicitly stated that this is not the case: "It is a mistake to believe that a society realizing both justice and the good (happiness) must necessarily accompany a materially high standard of living. People desire meaningful work in free associations with others, where such associations regulate human relationships within the framework of just basic institutions. Achieving this does not require enormous wealth" (TJ §44, 257-258=390).

Forrester's critique is partly fueled by frustration over the fact that, despite the hegemonic status of *A Theory of Justice* as normative theory, neoliberalism came to dominate real-world politics. This theme is discussed in chapter seven of *In the Shadow of Justice*, "The New Right and the Left." Her thesis is that "liberal philosophy was vulnerable to the New Right." If this claim is valid, it indeed casts a shadow over the effectiveness of *A Theory of Justice*.

However, the primary focus here is not Rawls but rather Ronald Dworkin and G.A. Cohen's "luck egalitarianism" (ISJ 208-218). They devised a theory of distributive justice responsive to responsibility by distinguishing between chance and choice. Yet, "the return to choice seemed a concession to the right" (ISJ 214). Even if Forrester's critique of both is valid—which requires further argumentation—*A Theory of Justice* cannot be equated with luck egalitarianism. While Rawls did focus on luck and contingency, he was negative about emphasizing self-responsibility. According to contemporary research standards, *A Theory of Justice* is increasingly seen as aiming for "relational egalitarianism" rather than "luck egalitarianism" (Freeman, 2018: 44-45, 144).⁸

If this interpretation is valid, it can be considered that *A Theory of Justice* and the liberal egalitarianism that follows it remain effective for future theories of justice. While Forrester's critique is sharp, it partially targets a straw man. *A Theory of Justice* never assumes the continuation of substantial economic growth. Although current growth rates in advanced countries are not high, a liberal policy package that positively inherits *A Theory of Justice* can be considered feasible. While Forrester advocates for the necessity of a more combative politics, even if such a route is chosen, liberal egalitarianism will remain an important framework (Kugelberg, 2020: 331-333).

Returning to Barry's critique concerning intergenerational justice, the underlying concern was that excessive development might exhaust resources and lead to ecological crises for the present generation. However, *A Theory of Justice* does not assume such development or growth, nor is it a story only possible in postwar affluent America. If sustainable development goals can be achieved, it is considered entirely possible to fulfill the just savings principle for future generations.⁹

To summarize the discussion in this section: the critique that *A Theory of Justice* assumes exceptional economic growth lacks persuasiveness, and the retreat of welfare politics in reality does not necessarily negate the significance of *A Theory of Justice*. The societal vision extending from a property-owning democracy may still be effective. However, since the above discussion relies on moderate growth, it might be considered an optimistic scenario for a theory of justice in the Anthropocene. The next section will explore debates surrounding zero growth.

IV. Theodicy of Growth / Theodicy of Difference

In this section, I will attempt to respond to another critique concerning the assumption of economic growth

⁸ Samuel Freeman argues that Rawls's relational egalitarianism is linked to property-owning democracy, while Dworkin's luck egalitarianism is compatible with welfare-state capitalism. Additionally, there are various conceptions within luck egalitarianism, some of which strongly aim for transformative change. Forrester, Katrina (2019) *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy*. New York: Princeton University Press.

⁹ Even in the current situation where the impacts of climate change are not yet fully manifest, the burden on future generations in the form of massive fiscal deficits is a significant issue.

in *A Theory of Justice*.

B) *A Theory of Justice* assumes economic growth and is therefore not useful for future intergenerational justice (and by extension, distributive justice).

In intellectual history studies tracing the foundational thought patterns of Rawls, S. Eich addresses this point, similarly issuing a negative judgment as Forrester does. That is, the theory of intergenerational justice in *A Theory of Justice* was based on the exceptional growth period in which it was written and became outdated precisely at the time of its publication (Eich, 2021: 986, 1000-1001). Furthermore, he raises two related claims. First, that "growth" was a fundamental premise in Rawls's thought. Second, that although Rawls began to refer favorably to Mill's stationary state after *A Theory of Justice*, this is merely a patchwork solution and lacks persuasiveness.

This section attempts to demonstrate that *A Theory of Justice* does not necessarily rely on growth by presenting alternative interpretations of both claims. First, the foundation of Rawls's thought is "difference," not "growth." Second, Rawls's references to the stationary state (Mill's ideas) have consistency and validity. If these interpretations are valid, they can also respond to Critique B.

Let's explore the first point. Eich formulates this as a "theodicy of growth." The idea of viewing Rawls's foundational thought pattern as a secularized theodicy is something I have attempted before, and our interpretations do not significantly diverge in this regard. Young Rawls held deep Christian beliefs but abandoned his faith shortly after his military service. However, remnants or continuations of his transformed faith are evident in various aspects of his thought pattern.

The theme of "the transformation of theodicy into a theory of justice" is often seen in the history of thought. For example, it was an issue addressed by Kant and Rousseau in response to the shock of the Lisbon earthquake. Our interpretations of Rawls share a similarity with the 18th-century zeitgeist, although I focus on issues of "evil" and Cassirer's studies on Rousseau, while Eich focuses on the discovery of market mechanisms and the birth of a new politico-economic order affirming wealth (Eich, 2021: 985-986).

According to him, the new politico-economic order that forms the background of Rawls's "theodicy of growth" is none other than the Bretton Woods system. Indeed, under this system, the United States and other Western countries enjoyed stable economic growth. John Kenneth Galbraith's *The Affluent Society* (1958) embodies the spirit of this era. In its seventh chapter, "Inequality," it is suggested that envy, which once encouraged imitation and competition, would diminish through economic growth. The optimistic assumptions in *A Theory of Justice*'s intergenerational justice are said to be compatible with this societal situation (Eich, 2021: 988, 999-1000, Galbraith, 1998).

However, precisely with the publication of *A Theory of Justice*, the Nixon shock occurred, leading to the collapse of this system. Hence, Eich's assessment is that the decline of Rawls's theory began with its completion, aligning with Forrester's critique. Since a re-critique of the assumptions about growth was already conducted in Section 3, I will now attempt to critique the interpretive framework of the "theodicy of growth."

First, there is the issue of how inherently Rawlsian this framework is. It is certain that Rawls affirmed growth. Moreover, an unpublished manuscript from 1964, "Is Political Philosophy Dead?" contains an intriguing claim that the task of future political philosophy is not merely to articulate concepts of freedom and equality, but to "give meaning to social life in affluent, secular communities" (Eich, 2021: 989).

However, Rawls's interests, of course, are not confined to growth. Particularly, despite using a term with strong religious connotations like "theodicy," the framework's bypassing of his engagement with the problem of evil is a significant omission. If one were to find a counterpart to Eich's formulation—an ideology justifying a new politico-economic order bringing prosperity—it would correspond to a certain type of

libertarianism or neoliberalism.¹⁰

Furthermore, to understand Rawls's foundational thought pattern, an interpretive framework that coherently interprets not only *A Theory of Justice* but also his other works is considered effective. Notably, in his later writings, he raised reconciliation with the fact of reasonable pluralism as an important theoretical task. The thesis I proposed, "theodicy of difference," is mindful of such issues. Although I will not elaborate on the specifics of "theodicy of difference" in this paper, I will later argue that focusing on "difference," rather than growth, is significant for a theory of justice in the Anthropocene.

Turning to the second point, concerning support for the stationary state. In works written in the mid-1980s—the period marking his transition to later thought—such as *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* and his "Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy," Mill's concept of the stationary state in *Principles of Political Economy* is favorably referenced. "It is certain that we do not wish to exclude Mill's idea of a just stationary state where (real) capital accumulation ceases. A property-owning democracy should consider this possibility" (Rawls, 2001: 315). Now, Rawls accepts the scenario of zero growth as a viable option.

For Eich, this represents a departure from the assumptions of significant economic growth that should have underpinned *A Theory of Justice*, seeing a straightforward discontinuity. In his view, Rawls's later support for the stationary state is merely a patchwork solution (Eich, 2021: 200-203). Moreover, this change stands in tension with the moral psychology of *A Theory of Justice*, as it was supposed to assume a decline in envy against the backdrop of an affluent society. Yet if growth ends, the optimistic assumptions may also lose their persuasiveness.

But how valid is Eich's interpretation? I would like to present two responses. First, Rawls's evaluation of Mill is already discernible at the time of *A Theory of Justice*. Second, even if economic growth ceases, it does not necessarily have a decisive negative impact on envy.

While *A Theory of Justice* is famous for its critique of utilitarianism, even in this work, Mill's moral psychology is favorably referenced. In section 76, "The Problem of Relative Stability," attention is drawn to Mill's claim in *Utilitarianism* about a "state of the human mind in which each person feels unity with others" (TJ §76, 439=656). As civilization progresses, people deepen their consideration for others' inequalities. Rawls interprets this as a desire more compatible with the difference principle than with the principle of utility. "Mill seems intuitively to recognize that a perfectly just society, where people's objectives are harmonized in an acceptable way for all, would follow the idea of reciprocity expressed by the principles of justice" (TJ §76, 439=657).

While it is certain that Rawls had been reading *Utilitarianism* since at least the early 1950s, there is currently no definitive documentary evidence regarding when he absorbed the stationary state theory from *Principles of Political Economy*. However, discomfort with a society where all envy disappears through simple economic growth—an idea Mill likely shared—is explicitly expressed in *A Theory of Justice*.

"A society where everyone can achieve their perfect good, or where all desires align without conflict and without coercively harmonizing activity plans, is, in a sense, beyond justice. Such a society removes the incentives that necessitate appeals to the principles of justice. Regardless of how desirable such a society might be, I have no interest in advocating such ideals" (TJ, 377).

¹⁰ The theorists of the "Arizona School," such as G. Gaus, J. Tomasi, and J. Brennan, are noted for their strong commitment to breaking the status quo and economic growth. Tomasi, John (2012) *Free Market Fairness*. Course Book. edn. Princeton: Princeton : Princeton University Press. p. 165. The Arizona School exhibits some fairly general aspects, but as a more refined attempt, the following conception, developing a unique growth-oriented liberalism from the perspective of "theodicy of happiness," is noteworthy.

It is particularly intriguing that the note attached to this passage considers "the fully communist society imagined by Marx." While scarcity of goods and limited altruism were objective conditions of the "circumstances of justice," Mill sought only to improve them, whereas Marx did not deny (or even aimed for) their transcendence. Rawls interprets the two in this way.¹¹ His sympathies lie with the latter.

The contrast between "a perfectly just society" and "a society beyond justice" in the two quotations may extend to the theodicies of difference and growth. Contrary to Eich's interpretation, *A Theory of Justice* does not celebrate limitless growth or radical moral changes but rather aims for moderate improvements under contemporary circumstances of justice. In this sense, *A Theory of Justice* can be said to have already possessed aspects compatible with a stationary state, even though it does not explicitly reference it.¹²

Next, I would like to consider the approach to dealing with envy. This issue is examined in section 81, "Envy and Equality." Three mechanisms that exacerbate this troublesome emotion are identified: 1) the decline of one's self-esteem, 2) the belief that this decline was caused by social environment, and 3) feelings of inferiority towards the fortunate and the resulting hostility. If left unchecked, envy would undoubtedly have adverse effects on society. So, how should it be addressed?

The basic idea is to decentralize "non-comparative groups." By having people belong plurally to such groups, each with different evaluation criteria, the promotion of envy can be restrained. This is because, even if one falls short in specific evaluation criteria, self-esteem is maintained if one engages in activities where they feel valuable. "What is necessary, therefore, is that there be at least one community shared by each person, where their efforts to pursue their purposes are affirmed and confirmed by their peers" (TJ 388).

This appears to be a reasonably persuasive idea, but in truth, despite discussing the issue of envy, Eich does not reference the discussion of these "non-comparative groups." This seems to be a significant oversight in interpreting the moral psychology of *A Theory of Justice*. Rawls's remedy for envy is based more on the pluralization of conceptions of the good rather than on economic growth. Furthermore, even if there were significant economic growth, if it took the form of the limitless expansion of capitalism, it would instead promote envy.

While growth is desirable, if it reduces diversity, it is counterproductive. Viewed from another angle, addressing envy through the pluralization of values does not require limitless growth. Of course, for the standard of living to develop to a certain extent and for diverse communities to form, growth is indispensable. However, once a certain level is achieved, what becomes more important is the concern that excessive economic development and the unification of values might lead to exploitation and alienation. This was likely a shared concern of Mill and Rawls. *A Theory of Justice* affirms difference under the moderated circumstances of justice, not limitless growth.

In 1998, towards the end of his life, Rawls exchanged letters with Philippe Van Parijs concerning *The Law of Peoples*, and even there, this stance is consistently emphasized. Rawls criticizes globalization and the trickle-down theory aimed merely at economic growth, suggesting that they lead to "a kind of meaningless consumerism-filled civil society." He concludes the letter by again positively referencing the stationary state. "I do not entertain fantasies about whether such [a stationary state] times will actually come. It is certain that they will not come immediately. However, they remain possible, and thus have a place in what I call a 'realistic utopia'" (Rawls and Van Parijs, 2003).

¹¹ The positive evaluation that Mill's utilitarianism is very close to "justice as fairness" and the negative evaluation that Marx's theory of justice assumes a society beyond justice are carried over in lectures on both figures. Rawls, John (2008) *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 534, 645.

¹² Freeman points out that there is a stronger affinity between Mill and Rawls's institutional designs and moral psychology than is usually thought. Freeman, Samuel (2018) *Liberalism and Distributive Justice*. 1 edn. New York: New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 45-50.

V. Why Should We Care About Future Generations?

If the preceding discussion is valid, it is indeed true that Rawls implicitly assumed economic growth, but this was a moderate assumption. Even in the Anthropocene, the theoretical framework of *A Theory of Justice* continues to offer a valid guide. However, while the previous discussion was a reactive response to criticism, this section attempts to assert a more proactive stance.

Returning to Chiba's categorization mentioned at the outset, climate change, an urgent issue of the Anthropocene, can be approached from three perspectives: 1) sustainable development, 2) a steady-state economy, and 3) degrowth. The analysis in section two aligns with the first perspective, while the analysis in section three aligns with the second. The third perspective is more challenging to evaluate, but unless faced with hard cases that demand a fundamental reevaluation of the "circumstances of justice," the current framework of normative political theory remains effective.

All three perspectives are intriguing. "At present, perhaps what is needed is dialogue, collaboration, and cooperation among these diverse paths and approaches". I agree with Chiba's observation. While my personal preference is 1 > 2 > 3, determining which stance holds validity will require empirical research and numerous considerations.

Notably, theorists focusing on climate change tend to rely on comprehensive doctrines (worldviews) in the terms of late Rawls. For example, Daly, who advocates for a steady-state economy, emphasizes his Protestant faith, while Latouche, who supports degrowth, references various radical views, including Ernst Bloch's utopian theory. Approaching comprehensive doctrines is not inherently problematic. However, measures must be devised to turn opposition into cooperation to avoid "wars of the gods."

Thus, rather than choosing a specific position, this paper focuses on finding common grounds that can be shared across all perspectives. Simply put, this concerns "the motivation for wishing for the survival of future generations." Although the three perspectives differ, they presumably share much in this regard. As discussions on climate change continue, recognizing overlapping consensus in motivational aspects is beneficial for a theory of justice in the Anthropocene.

In a hundred years, most people living today will likely no longer be present. Yet, most of us are not indifferent to the world after we are gone. Why is that? What reasons underlie this concern? Samuel Scheffler's *Why Worry About Future Generations?* examines this issue (Scheffler, 2013, Scheffler, 2018). It aims to address a more fundamental question that precedes concerns about climate change (WW 12-15). First, I will supplement three aspects of his problem awareness and argumentation.

First, Scheffler distances himself from the narrow moral theory type of intergenerational justice focused on population issues and ethics since Parfit. Parfit has developed various arguments from the perspective of beneficence toward future generations. While this is undoubtedly an important contribution, it is based on the perspective of an impartial observer, for better or worse. In contrast, Scheffler focuses on the diverse evaluative resources we presumably already possess and divides them into four reasons.

Second, related to the first point, there is an aspect of utilitarianism critique. Parfit's "Theory X," which is fundamentally rooted in utilitarianism, if discovered, would indicate "what ought to be done for future generations." However, it does not adequately explain "why we should care about future generations." Motivation has been a concern for Scheffler since his debut work, *The Rejection of Consequentialism*, and it continues in this book. As we will see, the naming of reasons such as "love" and "reciprocity" also contains an intention to contrast with utilitarianism.¹³

¹³ Additionally, I do not at all intend to deny the importance of Parfit's arguments or utilitarianism for intergenerational justice theory. When examining just rules and institutions, they will serve as a foundation for consideration. However, I also believe that a different approach is necessary for issues concerning moral psychology (motivation).

Third, although Rawls's intergenerational justice theory is not extensively referenced in *Why Worry About Future Generations?* (hereafter *WW*), Scheffler's approach itself is decidedly Rawlsian. In a sense, many contemporary normative theory researchers might be considered broad Rawlsians. However, he is a traditional Rawlsian, if I may say so, in that he is consciously engaged in conceptual analysis and argumentation that consider moral psychology.¹⁴ Therefore, Scheffler's examination, constructed in a manner compatible with Rawlsian theory, is considered significant for this paper.

Moving to the main argument, Scheffler provides four reasons for caring about future generations: 1) interest, 2) love, 3) valuation/valuing, and 4) reciprocity. While there are overlaps, the two combinations, 1 and 2, and 3 and 4, are initially distinguished. Although these are general terms, they contain unique implications, as we will see below.

Starting with the former pair, Scheffler begins his examination of the reasons for interest and love with a thought experiment called the "infertility scenario" (*WW* 41-42). According to this scenario, no one becomes pregnant, and no children are born for about 25 years. There is no prospect of improvement, and humanity will become extinct in about a hundred years.

If such a situation occurred, people would feel great melancholy and grief, but why? In this scenario, it is assumed that those already alive will live out their lives without major problems, and further, the need to care for succeeding generations has disappeared, so they could even indulge themselves. The standard of living might even be high. Nevertheless, the fact that humanity will soon become extinct has a unique negative impact on us.

The first consideration is that "long-term, goal-oriented collaborative activities" lose their meaning (*WW* 44). For example, projects like researching cancer treatments or spreading early childhood education worldwide would become almost unimportant if humanity were to disappear soon. Even if not as clear-cut, many of our activities share similar characteristics. Generally speaking, for "value-laden lives" to be possible, we need the assumption of a diachronic dimension.

"In that case, our reasons for attempting to ensure the survival of future generations ultimately seem to derive from purely self-interested reasons based on our concern for ourselves" (*WW* 53). In this way, we have reasons of "interest" in the survival of future generations.

However, as Scheffler adds, concern for the survival of future generations does not disappear if it is unrelated to our value-laden lives. Even if it does not relate to our lives—this applies more the further into the future we go—we should have a desire for the survival of future generations itself. This reason directed towards the survival of the world itself is "love."

In summary, concerning the relationship between interest and love, love is more fundamental. Particularly, love directed towards the world itself, independent of one's interests, is called humanity love (*WW* 62). Conversely, when the survival (assumption) of future generations relates to our value-laden lives, we have reasons of interest as the degree increases.

Turning to the pair of valuation and reciprocity, these two reasons are not entirely distinct from interest and love but are derived from considering "why we should care about future generations" from a different angle. We would be dismayed by the "infertility scenario," but the reason is not limited to our activities losing meaning (interest) or humanity's fate ending in ruin (love). Rather, a reason somewhat intermediate between the two can be assumed.

¹⁴ This characteristic is also observed in the above two points but is more pronounced in the 2010 work *Equality and Tradition*. The first chapter of this book is an essay titled "Valuing," contributed to a volume honoring T. M. Scanlon, and, as we will see below, it is used as one of the reasons for caring for future generations. Scheffler, Samuel (2010) *Equality and Tradition : Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory*. Oxford : Oxford University Press. pp. 15-40.

Namely, we cannot remain indifferent to the destruction of things we value or valuable things (WW 68-70). The practice of valuing something valuable, inherited from the past and persisting into the future, is something we are also concerned with. This is the reason for "valuation." Attitudes and dispositions towards culture, art, and tradition can be said to embody valuation.

Finally, there is the reason of "reciprocity." This may initially seem peculiar because reciprocity refers to mutually acceptable conditions or benefits among multiple agents, and such a relationship is not considered to exist between current and future generations. They do not coexist, and while the current generation can causally affect future generations, the reverse is impossible. In this sense, the two are extremely asymmetrical.

Scheffler proposes an evaluative reciprocity, distinct from general reciprocity. Consider the following case: you had a best friend, and one of your best friend's great-grandchildren, born after both of you have passed, becomes a Nobel laureate in World A but a mass murderer in World B. In this case, everyone would consider World A more desirable. Correspondingly, the meaning of your and your best friend's lives would also change. In other words, we are emotionally dependent on future people.

If this idea is extended, it becomes important for our lives to be fulfilling that future generations' lives are also fulfilling (as we can sincerely assume). "The prospect of the survival of future generations is a prerequisite and contributes to our ability to lead value-laden lives" (WW 73). As is evident from this, "the survival of future generations" does not merely mean survival. It must accompany a certain degree of enriched lives. Moreover, it is important that not only material prosperity but also the practice of valuation is passed on.

To summarize, the thought experiment of the "infertility scenario" reveals that we should have "a strong desire for the chain of human generations to extend indefinitely into the future under conditions conducive to human flourishing" (WW 63). This is tied to various attachments we presumably already have rather than an impartial concern for future generations.

Scheffler's attempt to segment such evaluative resources into four reasons—interest, love, valuation, and reciprocity—is broadly persuasive and suggestive for a theory of justice in the Anthropocene. Particularly, the focus on motivation, often overlooked in normative theory, is significant. It is also effective as a theoretical framework for collaboration among the three different positions considering climate change.

Nevertheless, various questions can be raised regarding Scheffler's argument. For example, the relationship between the four reasons is not necessarily clear, and they may even seem to conflict at times (I will later address the point of whether "love" and "valuation" conflict). Additionally, the rationale for each reason can be questioned. However, I will focus on the point that personally intrigued me the most: the claim that reasons for caring about future generations are related to a conservative disposition.

This relates to conservatism in a cultural rather than political sense (Scheffler is politically a liberal egalitarian). We feel attached to existing valuable things more than to those that might be more highly valued from an impartial and neutral perspective. Even if destroying familiar things would lead to greater value, many would hesitate. This is particularly evident in the reason for valuation.

Furthermore, Scheffler argues that this kind of conservative disposition does not contradict creativity. Instead, as artists can only create original works in the extension of existing traditions or works, or through the mastery of skills, the practice of valuation must be passed down over time for something new to be brought into the world. "Rephrased as applied to the future of humanity, a conservative disposition is a disposition that ensures the continuity of human creativity and innovation" (WW 119).

Such appreciation for a certain kind of conservatism is not unique to Scheffler. According to Masanori Mori, since the 1970s, with the recognition of the limits of growth, such commitments have been recognized in left-wing movements. Among them was even a combination of "radicalism seeking alternative civilizations

and conservatism in the sense of preserving human community capable of coexisting with nature". The three positions—1) sustainable development, 2) a steady-state economy, and 3) degrowth—might also inherit such New Left thought. Scheffler's statement below is considered to formulate well the disposition and its significance lurking in the spirit of the past half-century. "Stated in a manner that might sound paradoxical only superficially, much of our concern for the future of humanity and the flourishing of future generations relies on a conservative disposition that applies directly only to values existing now and carried from the past" (WW 122, emphasis in original).

This might be called "conservatism for the future" or a "conservative disposition for future generations." It relates to Barry's intergenerational justice theory seen at the end of section two, considering not only the depletion of material resources but also the depletion of valuing resources. This conservative disposition restrains the orientation towards a post-human world that "realizes it through the driving force of capitalist competition without giving time to think about what a desirable future is".

Our current conservative disposition is indispensable for caring about the survival of future generations. This also seems to be an insightful suggestion for a theory of justice in the Anthropocene. However, two issues should be pointed out.

First, there is the issue of what constitutes valuable things worth preserving. Even if a formal consensus is reached on the importance of valuation and a conservative disposition, determining what specifically is valuable is not easy. Furthermore, as time progresses, the criteria for valuation itself are expected to change. In a sense, the fact of reasonable pluralism exists not only synchronically but also diachronically. The latter is considered a more challenging issue.

However, focusing on common evils regarding what should not be preserved can provide some outlook. Particularly, severe restrictions should be imposed on leaving burdens full of risks that significantly undermine future generations' possibilities and choices. In an era where growth has plateaued, seriously reconsidering the "Lockean proviso"—that enough and as good is left in common for others—while being conscious of intergenerational trust is necessary.

Second, the issue of love and valuation potentially conflicting arises. Without going into detail, in the ending of the manga version of *Nausicaä of the Valley of the Wind*, the protagonist Nausicaä is offered a crucial deal concerning the future of humanity by the guardian of the crypt (who knows the truth of the fictional world) but refuses it. In the terms of this paper, this is because it would enhance the possibility of future generations' survival but destroy valuation. However, from another perspective, Nausicaä's choice could be seen as prioritizing existing valuation over the survival of future generations. It is a difficult question of who had more humanity love, Nausicaä or the crypt's guardian. Parfit might have agreed to the guardian's deal. Here lies a dilemma between love and valuation.

However, this is a hard case. While it is crucial not to leave a decisive negative legacy for future generations, there is no need to be overly pessimistic about the future. It is reasonably conceivable that breakthroughs may address difficult problems that currently seem insurmountable. The crux of Nausicaä's response seems to have been to reject the perspectival distortion or hubris that we can fully articulate and decide everything about future generations now. What is important, therefore, is not simple utopianism but leaving resources so future generations can perform valuation in their unique ways. Love is probably not about imposing unilaterally but a wish for continuation based on separation.

Finally, I would like to note that *Why Worry About Future Generations?* evokes the thought of Hannah Arendt. Although Scheffler does not reference Arendt, the fundamental ideas resonate with her notions of "love of the world" and "immortality contrasted with eternity." Arendt also argued that "beginnings" become possible in a world with continuity and durability, which can be connected to Scheffler's examination of conservative disposition (Arendt, 2015, Raz et al., 2003).

In the geological epoch where human activities have come to influence ecosystems, namely the

Anthropocene, the recursive preservation of the human condition will increasingly become a pressing issue. Arendt's claim may be a controversial comprehensive doctrine, but it indeed presents a vision. Moreover, I believe that "transforming budding visions into shareable reasons," not only "pure conceptual analysis divorced from people's motivations"¹⁵, is also an important task of normative theory.

This was precisely the endeavor *A Theory of Justice* undertook. The vision of the original position, discussed at its conclusion, seems to retain a profound resonance that demands further contemplation when reconnected to the issue of caring for future generations.¹⁶

"Without amalgamating all people into one, by acknowledging people as separate and independent entities, this [original position] perspective allows us to stand on an impartial and fair stance—even among people belonging to many generations who do not share the same era. Therefore, viewing our circumstances in society from this perspective is tantamount to understanding it under the aspect of eternity (sub specie aeternitatis). That is, it means gazing at the human condition not only from all social perspectives but also from all temporal viewpoints. The perspective of eternity is not a view from beyond this world, nor is it the perspective of a transcendent being. Rather, it is a particular form of thought and emotion that rational people can adopt within this world" (TJ 514)

VI. Conclusion and Challenges

This paper set out to address the question: "Can *A Theory of Justice* still be valid in the consideration of justice in the Anthropocene?" In section two, we examined Forrester's critique of Rawls regarding intergenerational justice as presented in *In the Shadow of Justice*. In sections three and four, I attempted to respond to the critiques by Forrester and Eich, who argued that *A Theory of Justice* is based on (exceptional) economic growth and is thus not useful for future justice theories. I did this by offering alternative interpretations. The main point is that *A Theory of Justice* can and should be interpreted from the perspective of "difference" rather than "growth," and if so, much of its framework remains relevant. In section five, as a proactive discussion that different positions on climate change can share, I considered the question of why we should care about future generations, drawing on Scheffler's analysis. His segmentation of four justificatory reasons and focus on a conservative disposition are broadly persuasive and contribute to a theory of justice in the Anthropocene. Moreover, it extends the inquiry of moral psychology from *A Theory of Justice* by focusing on people's motivations.

There are, of course, many topics left undiscussed. I would like to conclude by noting three supplementary points or challenges. First, I do not intend to deny the significance of the critique of *A Theory of Justice* presented in *In the Shadow of Justice*. Indeed, it is a polemical work, and its style may sometimes appear lacking in persuasiveness or sweeping. The discussion surrounding growth is one such area. However, Forrester's problematization—that *A Theory of Justice* might have cast a shadow that closed off change—is valid, and further responses and considerations are necessary. In my view, what is needed is not to render *A Theory of Justice* entirely obsolete but to elaborate on it in light of new issues, essentially rewriting it.

Second, while this paper showed that *A Theory of Justice* did not necessarily presuppose economic growth and that there is consistency in Rawls's evaluation of Mill's stationary state, I could not elaborate on the social image or institutional configuration that could be derived from this. The liberal democracy that Rawls advocates contains strong "social" elements, but in reality, such ideals have long been in retreat. It may be necessary to re-examine a liberalism that (partially) recognizes the possibility of "liberal socialism," which Rawls also mentions. However, this would aim for moderate improvement rather than fundamental

¹⁵ Scheffler refers to this method as the axiology approach and criticizes it for failing to fully capture the attachments people have (WW 87-104)

¹⁶ This is one of the passages in *A Theory of Justice* where a comprehensive vision is presented. However, considering Arendt's terminology, "immortality" might be more appropriate than "eternity."

transformation of the status quo, continuing the lineage of Mill rather than Marx.

Third, there are challenges related to Scheffler's *Why Worry About Future Generations?* Scheffler's discussion is beneficial, but it does not provide a completely persuasive answer. Rather, its significance lies in presenting the question "Why should we care about future generations?" from a unique perspective. In section five, I raised points such as the nature of a conservative disposition and valuation, as well as the potential conflict between love and valuation, but these should be explored in more detail. Traditional intergenerational justice theories focused on issues of resources and population, but referencing Scheffler's discussion, issues such as motivations across generations and intergenerational tolerance also emerge. These considerations will be future challenges.

In the following works, abbreviations are used, and reference locations are incorporated within parentheses in the text. Some translations have been slightly modified from existing ones.

- **[ISJ]** K. Forrester, *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, 2019.
- **[TJ]** J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition, Harvard University Press, 1999.
- **[WW]** S. Scheffler, *Why Worry About Future Generations?*, Oxford University Press, 2018.

References

- [1] Arendt, Hannah (2015) *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- [2] Barry, Brian (1977) 'Justice between Generations', in Hacker, P.M.S. & Raz, J. (eds.) *Law, Morality, and Society : Essays in Honour of H. L. A. Hart*. Oxford: Oxford : Clarendon, pp. 268-284.
- [3] Barry, Brian (1978) 'Circumstances of Justice and Future Generations', in Sikora, R.I. & Barry, B. (eds.) *Obligations to Future Generations*: Chicago: Temple University Press, pp. 204-248.
- [4] Daly, Herman E. (1997) *Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- [5] Dryzek, John S., Pickering, Jonathan and Pickering, Jonathan (2019) *The Politics of the Anthropocene*. 1 edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [6] Eich, Stefan (2021) 'The Theodicy of Growth: John Rawls, Political Economy, and Reasonable Faith', *Modern Intellectual History* 18(4), pp. 984-1009. DOI: 10.1017/S1479244320000475.
- [7] Forrester, Katrina (2019) *In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy*. New York: Princeton University Press.
- [8] Freeman, Samuel (2018) *Liberalism and Distributive Justice*. 1 edn. New York: New York: Oxford University Press.
- [9] Galbraith, John Kenneth (1998) *The Affluent Society*. London: Penguin Books.
- [10] Kugelberg, Henrik D. (2020) 'In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy', *Jurisprudence*, 11(2), pp. 325-334. DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2020.1737471.
- [11] Latouche, Serge (2010) 'Degrowth', *Journal of cleaner production*, 18(6), pp. 519-522. DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2010.02.003.
- [12] Moyn, Samuel (2018) *Not Enough : Human Rights in an Unequal World*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- [13] Parfit, Derek (1986) *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- [14] Rawls, John (2001) *Justice as Fairness : A Restatement*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.
- [15] Rawls, John (2008) *Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- [16] Rawls, John and Van Parijs, Philippe (2003) 'Three Letters on the Law of Peoples and the European Union', *Autour de Rawls*, 8, pp. 7-20.
- [17] Raz, Joseph, Wallace, R. Jay and Wallace, R. Jay, Jr. (2003) *The Practice of Value*. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, Incorporated.

- [18] Scheffler, Samuel (2010) *Equality and Tradition : Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory*. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- [19] Scheffler, Samuel (2013) *Death and the Afterlife*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- [20] Scheffler, Samuel (2018) *Why Worry About Future Generations?* First edition.. edn.: Oxford : Oxford University Press.
- [21] Shue, Henry (1993) 'Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions', *Law & policy*, 15(1), pp. 39-60. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9930.1993.tb00093.x.
- [22] Tomasi, John (2012) *Free Market Fairness*. Course Book. edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press.