



The Position on The Baghdad Pact Through the Memoirs of Jordanian Politicians

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Abstract

The Baghdad Pact of 1955 was a regional alliance that shaped geopolitics and polarised the Arab world. Jordan had to balance pressure from Egypt, Iraq, and Britain during their difficult internal policy discussions over the agreement. This study utilized primary source memoirs from senior Jordanian politicians involved in decision-making under two governments to fill literature gaps and offer fresh insights into Jordan's internal decision-making process during a pivotal period. The study findings revealed the great majesty King Hussein achieved significant success in various fields, leading Jordan to break away from the British control in the Jordanian-British treaty. However, the British government postponed this until a defense alliance was established in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact, a defunct military alliance consisting of Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, aimed to counter communism in the region. Britain exerted significant pressure on Jordan to join this alliance. Overall, Jordan's decision to join the Baghdad Pact was divided into two parts: one that believed it provided economic and military aid, and the other that saw it as a colonial ploy. The study presents personal notes of Jordanian politicians, who expressed their views on the alliance, either rejecting it or accepting it, highlighting the potential dangers of the eastern camp, which Jordan has no interest in. In essence, this study fulfilled understanding of Jordan's internal political process in navigating regional realignments, filling gaps in its decision-making process through analysis of high-level primary sources.

Keywords: Baghdad Pact, Jordanian Foreign Policy, Arab-Israel Conflict, Regional Alliance, Jordan-Iraq Relations, Jordan-Britain Relations, Political Memoirs, Internal State Debates.

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1. Introduction

The idea of the Baghdad Pact emerged after US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles emphasized the importance of defending the Middle East in the future, citing the countries in the northern belt as a potential threat to communism. He believed that a common defence system could not be imposed

externally but must be created within due to a shared destiny and danger. This initiative was launched following his 1953 tour of the Middle East¹.

Therefore, the Baghdad Pact, has served as a defensive alliance between Arab countries on the Soviet borders, was formed between 1955 AD and 1939 AD. It created two opposing Arab poles: Iraq, which supported the alliance, and Egypt, which rejected it. The Jordanian arena was the first arena of the Iraqi-Egyptian clash, with Iraq, supported by Britain, exploiting Jordan's material and military needs to attract it. Egypt, supported by Britain, supported its rejection through Jordanian political bias, exploiting the Jordanian street's hatred for Britain and their relationship with Britain. The study aims to shed light on the Baghdad Pact and its impact on Arab-Arab and Arab-international relations.

Further, in 1954, Britain reconsidered its alliance treaties with Middle Eastern countries, aiming to establish a defensive alliance. Iraq, Turkey, Britain, Pakistan, and Iran joined the Baghdad Pact, and Jordan was one of the first Arab countries nominated. However, due to a media war between Baghdad and Cairo, Jordan hesitated in taking any position, resulting in a critical situation. The Jordanian Council of Ministers held varied positions, with some supporting the decision, others opposing it, and others withdrawing from the Council².

In his book "It's Not Easy to Be King," His Majesty the late Hussein bin Talal details the disturbances of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 AD. The Arab world experienced a turning point after the Cold War between Egypt and Jordan, culminating in the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the surprising Czech arms deal with the Soviet bloc. His Majesty proposed a free alliance to unite the Arab world against the growing communist tide, warning against any Arab country forming an alliance with the free world. Despite this, the Baghdad Pact was announced in 1955 AD, and Iraq joined it, as Britain contained Iraq due to its interests in the region's oil and influence.³

In addition, the geopolitical aspects of the Baghdad Pact and Arab stances towards the alliance are analysed in literature, but there is a lack of understanding about how Jordan arrived at its positions. Most historical analyses take Jordan's stated positions at face value without scrutinizing the internal policy debates that led to these stances. This information gap emphasises the kingdom's decision-making capabilities amid regional realignment. However, the Jordanian Politicians Primary source memoirs provided insight into arguments, lobbying attempts, and developing attitudes that affected decisions but were hidden from view. Utilising this opportunity to fill the highlighted gaps in the literature by Jordan's leadership and power dynamics within the kingdom, this study provided a clearer understanding of how external influences were translated into policy.

Moreover, this study aims to uncover the calculus behind Jordan's diplomacy, addressing a lack of understanding of the monarchy's internal political process. Through the examination of personal memoirs, which are primary sources created by high-level decision-makers, the study aimed to reveal domestic power dynamics and debates that shaped Jordan's response to the Pact negotiations. Lastly, the analysis of these memoirs through bureaucratic politics theory, the study offered valuable insights into how small states navigate complex regional alignments during periods of great flux. This will help to reshape understanding of Jordan's diplomacy and its internal political process.

2. The First Demand: The Government of Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda and The Baghdad Pact (October 14, 1954 - May 28, 1955).

Based on King Hussein's belief that the Jordanian-British Treaty imposed restrictions on Jordan beyond alliance and friendship. He sent Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda and Defense Minister Anwar Nusseibeh to London to amend the treaty, arguing that the method of paying aid should be directly to the Jordanian government. Britain pays aid to Chief of Staff Klopp, but Jordan wants Britain to pay aid directly to the Jordanian government and not offer control or broader supervision of army expenditures. Abu Al-Huda aimed to make the aid fixed fees for Jordan's military bases, increase aid to the National Guard, and enable the Jordanian government to build a squadron of combat aircraft for the Arab army⁴.

These negotiations did not yield a positive result, the Jordanian requests were not accepted by the British side, except for increasing aid to the National Guard⁵. The British government apologized for providing funds to build the military force, under the pretext that this entailed large financial expenditures. British documents revealed the British government's dissatisfaction with Abu al-Huda's lack of appreciation for the offer of additional assistance to the National Guard⁶.

Hazza Al-Majali reports that after Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda returned to Amman after a visit to London, tensions in relations between Jordan and Britain were unsatisfactory. Abu Al-Huda had intended to resign, but the Council of Ministers advised him to withdraw. The British government did not address the statement amending the treaty with Britain, which clarified talks between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Saeed and Britain. Al-Saeed suggested two future plans: the Arab League forming a defense alliance with the West, and no need for agreements and treaties. The amending of the Jordanian-British treaty will depend on the outcome of the Nuri al-Said treaties in the near future⁷. Thus, the page on amending the British treaty was closed, and was postponed at the request of the British government until after the end of the current developments in the Middle East.

As soon as Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda returned from London, Egypt called for a meeting of Arab prime ministers to be held in Cairo - and this was after Egypt's attempt to dissuade Iraq from its intention to cooperate with the West and follow the policy of alliances - and in February 1955 AD, Iraq and Turkey held the Baghdad Pact and the texts of this were broadcast. The agreement was reached, and then the Egyptian press and radio rose up and the Arab League was called to an urgent meeting to consider this matter, as Egypt and Saudi Arabia saw in the Baghdad Pact a departure from the Arab League Pact and a push for the Arab countries into the cold war existing between the two camps⁸.

The Jordanian Council of Ministers called for a meeting before heading to Cairo. Prime Minister Abu Al-Huda was in Beirut, where Foreign Minister Walid Salah welcomed the Iraqi-Turkish agreement and demanded Jordan's support. The Council of Ministers decided to summon the president and consult on the matter. After Abu Al-Huda's return, a meeting was held, and it was decided that Jordan would remain moderate due to its need for assistance from all Arab countries and to try to heal the rift and settle the issue⁹.

In response to the invitation the Jordanian government sent a delegation to Cairo, led by Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda and Walid Salah, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The delegation aimed to address the acting ambassador of the Iraqi Embassy, stating that their cause needed effort. During their presence, Jordan's position was moderate, not supporting Iraq or encouraging any actions against it. This was also the case for Syria and Lebanon, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia continued their campaign against the Charter¹⁰.

Abu Al-Huda returned to Amman, leaving Walid Salah in Cairo due to his daughter's illness and represent Al-Huda¹¹. Salah has no choice and violated the Council of Ministers' instructions and demanded Iraq's removal from the League of Arab States, not joining the Turkish alliance, and not including Iraq in the unified command. Jordanian delegation member Awni Abdul Hadi disagreed with this, and Iraqi representative Najib Al-Rawi attacked him. The Jordanian Council of Ministers instructed Salah to oppose sanctions against Iraq, not be influenced by emotion or enthusiasm, and to delay Egypt's announcement until the agreement is signed. This led to a confrontation between the Jordanian delegation and Iraqi representatives¹². After the Jordanian delegation received the new instructions, it quickly withdrew its proposal, and the meeting ended without any decision being taken due to the difficulty of obtaining a unified decision.

After returning from Cairo, Walid Salah had an argument with Hazza Al-Majali in the Council of Ministers. Salah revealed that Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda encouraged him to join the Baghdad Pact, which Al-Majali was not surprised by. Al-Majali was blamed for his silence and support of the Egyptian-Saudi point of view against Iraq, as well as Al-Nabulsi, a friend of Salah's in the National Party. To take a firm stance on the ongoing conflict, the Council decided to poll Britain and America about the benefits Jordan could obtain if it joined the Baghdad Pact. The Prime Minister summoned ambassadors from Iraq, Turkey, Britain, and the United States, briefed them on the Jordanian point of view, and asked for their governments' responses on this matter¹³.

As a result of this tension in relations between Jordan and Iraq, King Hussein visited Baghdad in an attempt to learn the secrets of the alliance, and to persuade the Iraqi government not to sign it. He did not succeed in doing so, which prompted King Faisal to visit Amman to discuss with King Hussein Jordan's policy towards Iraq and the possibility of entering the Baghdad Pact. Especially after the statements announced by Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda regarding Jordan's refusal to enter the alliance, which places Iraq in complete political isolation from the Arab countries, and disappoints the hopes of Iraq and Britain in Jordan's entry into the alliance. The statement made by Abu Al-Huda had a bad impact in both Baghdad and London¹⁴.

This Jordanian position led Britain to abandon the idea of including Jordan in the Baghdad Pact, especially after Jordan refused to hand over British aid to the Jordanian army or even to the Jordanian government, in addition to not reaching an agreement on amending the Jordanian-British treaty¹⁵. But the idea of abandonment was only temporary and was withdrawn as a result of subsequent developments, especially after Farhan Shubailat's meeting with Nouri al-Saeed and Adnan Menderes, when they carried a message to King Hussein in which they explained that if Jordan participated, Turkey and Iraq would provide him with weapons and economic aid, in addition to British aid.

Iraqi Chargé d'Affairs met with Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda in Amman after the signing of the Baghdad Pact to convince Jordan to join the alliance. Jordan agreed to join if Britain assured it would amend or cancel its treaty with it. Jordan's special situation, including need for economic and military support, justified joining the alliance. The Council of Ministers discussed determining a firm position for Jordan and sought the opinions of Britain and America on the benefits of joining. However, the Ministry of Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda resigned on May 29, 1955, and was accused of having close ties to Saudi Arabia, which opposed the Baghdad Pact. King Hussein appointed Saeed Al-Mufti to form a new government¹⁶.

2.1. Summary:

Examining Jordan's conversations over the Baghdad Pact under Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu Al-Huda, different divisions and conflicting opinions within the cabinet were observed. The memoirs include overseas trips, including King Hussein's visit to Baghdad, and demonstrated Jordan's meticulous consideration of alliances and national objectives. However, it can also be interpreted as Amman had no choice except to accept Egypt's disapproval of efforts at reconciliation and the British stubbornness over changing the treaty. As conditions changed, Jordan's positions changed as well. Leaders such as Abu Al-Huda thought that joining an alliance would have both military and economic advantages. Differentiating between consultant politicians' duties indicates a lack of agreement and convoluted policymaking

3. The Second Demand: The Government of Saeed Al-Mufti and The Baghdad Pact (May 30, 1955 AD - December 14, 1955 AD)

Saeed Al-Mufti stated after the formation of his government that his government they did not think about joining the Iraqi-Turkish alliance due to the strong opposition it has raised in various Arab countries, and that Jordan took this position out of concern for the friendly relations that bind it with all Arab countries in general, and with Egypt in particular¹⁷.

The Jordanian government continued its position until Gamal Abdel Nasser announced on September 27, 1955, the conclusion of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, which Hazza considered as a purely Egyptian measure related to its right to maintain its safety and security in the face of the Israeli threat, and that this does not deviate from the framework of Egypt's being It is sovereign and has the right to pursue the policy that ensures the continuity of its policy, in addition to the fact that this deal came as a result of Western countries' refusal to supply Egypt with weapons¹⁸.

In contrast, Western nations saw the agreement as a significant challenge to their own, one that called for re-arming friendly Middle Eastern nations as part of a plan to provide the Baghdad Pact's member nations with the supplies and military hardware required to halt the rise of communism¹⁹. In light of these conditions, several nations attempted to enlist Jordan in this coalition, such as Turkey's attempts to do so through the Baghdad Pact ²⁰. The first step towards Jordan's inclusion in the Baghdad Pact was taken by Turkey. The visit to Jordan by Turkish President Celal Bayar and Foreign Minister Fatin Zorlu was in retaliation for the late King Abdullah's and later King Hussein's frequent trips to Turkey (The newspapers reported at the time that the visit was personal and had nothing to do with political issues.)²¹.

In order to consolidate Jordanian-Turkish relations, His Majesty decided to raise the diplomatic representation between Jordan and Turkey to the level of an embassy²². This visit resulted in a meeting attended by the King, Prime Minister Saeed Al-Mufti, Minister of Court Fawzi Al-Mulki, and Chief of Staff Klopp. The Turkish President emphasized the benefits Jordan could gain by joining an alliance with Britain, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. By joining, Jordan would no longer need to rely solely on Britain's assistance, and the entire Council could arrange necessary measures to strengthen Jordan²³.

The Turkish side confirmed that once Jordan signs the alliance, the Arab Army can send a military mission to Ankara to establish Turkish military assistance in case of aggression. His Majesty requested military aid of two infantry and one armoured division, but the Turks apologized for the lack of assistance, citing a Turkish economic crisis²⁴. King Hussein told the Turkish President his awareness of the advantages of the alliance in light of the need for economic aid and a military alliance after the Palestine War had exhausted Jordan, and the presence of refugees, in addition to the necessity of considering the Jordanian-British treaty. The President's response was to write to the British government to explain the additional aid that Jordan needs. Indeed, the British ambassador was handed a memorandum in which he explained the demands and difficulties we face²⁵.

At the end of the meeting, it was decided to submit a memorandum of Jordanian demands to the British government, and to support these demands by the Turkish delegation. It was stated in this memorandum that Jordan's policy aims to:

- Maintaining Arab collective guarantee by enabling Jordan to carry out its obligations under the provisions of the Charter.
- Absolute support for achieving Arab demands and rights in Palestine, and repelling aggression against Jordan, whatever its source should consist of an infantry squad, armed squad, heavy artillery, parachute brigade, commanders' group, air force of bombers and fighters, and a small naval force in the Dead Sea and Aqaba, considering both domestic and international situations and allowing the Jordanian government to create the appropriate atmosphere ²⁶.

Additionally, in statements made by the President of the Turkish Republic, he stressed the Turkish army's determination to provide assistance to the Jordanian army in the event that Jordan was attacked. However, people in Jordan were dissatisfied with the alliance with Turkey due to the criticism it took in its relationship with Israel²⁷. The Turkish delegation's visit to Amman was met with widespread dissatisfaction. Crowds did not applaud the visitors and king, leading to small demonstrations in Jerusalem, Nablus, and Ramallah. The press also expressed dissatisfaction with Turkish diplomacy, trade relations with Israel, and support for France in North Africa. The government's secrecy surrounding the visit's objectives further fuelled public dissatisfaction²⁸.

Saeed Al-Mufti also suffered from a health problem, as a result of which he retreated to his home, leaving the duties of his position to his deputy, Hazza Al-Majali, who seized the opportunity to give free rein to acting as acting prime minister in preparing the internal atmosphere for joining the alliance, which paved the way for him to emerge as an alternative to Saeed Al-Mufti to proceed with his plan to annex Jordan.

(For the alliance, he chaired the session of the House of Representatives on November 18, in which he presented the results of the Turkish President's discussions in Amman, and explained to the Council the benefits that the government hopes to gain as a result of joining the Baghdad Pact²⁹.

However, the visit of the Turkish President and his Foreign Minister, which lasted for five days, ended with the Turkish delegation leaving without signing any agreement.

Iraqi efforts to include Jordan in the Baghdad Pact.

With the Prime Minister taking over the government, he announced to the head of mission of the Iraqi Commission in Amman, stressing the strength of the bond that links the Jordanian and Iraqi families, as the Mufti was looking forward to Iraqi economic assistance that would help the Jordanian government in alleviating the economic burdens imposed on it.

These endeavours and attempts began with the previously mentioned meeting, which included Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, and Mr. Farhan Shubilat, the Jordanian Commissioner in Baghdad on 11/24/1955 AD. The two presidents carried a message to King Hussein stating that if Jordan joined the Baghdad Pact, Turkey and Iraq will help him with weapons and economic aid, in addition to British aid³⁰.

Iraq contacted the Jordanian government, proposing to send a delegation to Baghdad to discuss the possibility of Iraq providing economic assistance to Jordan. Following that, it was decided to send Hazza al-Majali, the Minister of the Interior, and Naeem Abdul Hadi, the Minister of Economy, to head an economic delegation to Baghdad, in order to obtain a financial loan to finance a number of projects. However, Negotiations with Iraqi officials had faltered due to their stipulation that Jordan enter the Baghdad Pact, and they refused to make the financial loan linked to any political conditions, as Jordanian policy is not determined by its financial need, but rather by Jordan's highest interest³¹.

During the initial visit to Iraq, the Jordanian delegation faced challenges as the Iraqi government refused economic assistance unless Jordan linked to the Baghdad Pact. Hazza al-Majali, the King's representative, believed Jordan's policy was not determined by material needs. The Jordanian delegation prepared to leave Baghdad, but the Iraqi government's position changed quickly³². The Jordanian delegation was asked to attend a meeting, where it decided to lend to Jordan. This change was influenced by two reasons: the possibility of the Iraqi government finding out about the Jordanian delegation's refusal to provide assistance and the news that the British envoy to Jordan, General Gerald Templer, was dispatched to negotiate Jordan's accession to the alliance³³.

It is worth mentioning that Hazza's relationship with the royal family in Iraq was close and had been established since the era of King Abdullah. He was in close contact with them following mutual visits between the royal families in Iraq and Jordan. Perhaps the Iraqis' awareness of Hazza's reality in the royal house, as Hazza mentions, was behind Their warm welcome on this visit³⁴. British efforts to include Jordan in the Baghdad Pact included several factors combined to lead to the British initiative to negotiate with the Jordanian government for Jordan's accession to the alliance.

The first factor Egypt's success in obtaining weapons from Czechoslovakia and its generous financial offers due to its dependence on Saudi Arabia have sparked concerns about Jordan's potential for seeking weapons from the eastern bloc. This fear stems from Britain's fear of Jordan seeking weapons from the eastern bloc, as Egypt's high position in Jordanian public opinion has made its pledge to provide military aid an issue. Egypt is committed to winning Jordan's support. Al-Majali spoke about the Al-Majali discussed the Czech arms deal with Egypt, stating that it is related to Egypt's sovereignty and no one has the right to object or complain about it. He mentioned a letter from the Jordanian Embassy in Cairo in 1955, which angered the British government due to the Soviet Union's desire to establish diplomatic relations with Jordan and sign an agreement to extend a helping hand³⁵.

The second factor is what Nouri Al-Saeed told me, which is Iraq's feeling of isolation in this alliance because it is the only Arab member of the alliance and that the political, military and financial power of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia is allied against it³⁶. In addition, the third factor is what the British ambassador in Amman conveyed to the British government about Jordan's readiness to join the alliance on the condition that it provides the necessary support according to a dialogue that took place between him and King Hussein. The fourth factor stops at the Turkish visit, which resulted in a memorandum sent to the British side, supporting the Turkish side's Jordanian requirements in the event of joining the party³⁷.

The fourth factor is that if Jordan enters into a defense or military agreement with Egypt, it will not take long to end British control over the Arab army, as President Gamal Abdel Nasser's goal is to create a "Jordan without a club," that is, uproot British influence and place Jordan in the Egyptian orbit. All of these factors led the British government to decide the inclusion of Jordan in the Baghdad Pact due to various factors, including the military requirements of the Jordanian government and the close relationship between His Majesty the King and General Templer. They sent General Templer to Amman to convince the Jordanian government to join the alliance³⁸.

Shukbara, Under-Secretary of the British Foreign Office, sent a letter to General Templer containing the terms of the mission entrusted to him in Amman. The indicative letter hinted at withdrawing financial aid to Jordan if it did not join the alliance. But "Shakbara" did not know that the highest military rank in Britain would return to being a trail of disappointment, and that the Jordanians would not allow a threat, whether hidden or apparent, to affect the entity of the Jordanian state, and that a few months would pass and His Majesty the King would adopt the dismissal of the Jordanian army commander, "Klopp," from his position.

Klubb Pasha believed that the time was not appropriate to enter into negotiations with Jordan to persuade it to enter the Baghdad Pact, for several reasons, including that he did not want the negotiations, in which a British military delegation was participating, to succeed. Because his role will be secondary and he is the one who should have the first opinion of the English in the Middle East, so he did not cooperate with the government in suppressing the demonstrations. When Hazza al-Majali asked him to stand up to the demonstrations, he did not prevent them and did not implement the order³⁹.

In order to ensure the success of its mission in Jordan without an attack by Egyptian radio, Britain instructed its ambassador in Cairo to inform Abdel Nasser that the Templar mission in Jordan was not for Jordan to join the alliance, but rather to discuss supplying Jordan with weapons. But Abdel Nasser was convinced that Britain cannot send this rank simply for arms shipments⁴⁰. On December 6, 1955, General Templer arrived in Amman to discuss Arab Army matters. He met with the President of the Mufti, the Minister of Defense, and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Templer discussed the political, economic, and military benefits Jordan could gain from joining the alliance and expressed Britain's readiness to replace the British-Jordanian treaty with an agreement under the alliance. He also emphasized that Israel was excluded from joining and claimed Britain would defend Jordan until attacked.

On December 6, 1955, Templar arrived in Amman, and the press reported at the time that the purpose of the general's visit was to discuss matters pertaining to the Arab Army⁴¹. On the second day, Templer met with the President of the Mufti, the Minister of Defense, Farhan Shubailat, and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bahaa al-Din Toukan. Templer outlined the political, economic, and military benefits that Jordan could benefit from as soon as it joined the alliance, and expressed Britain's readiness to replace the British-Jordanian treaty with an agreement under the alliance. Baghdad. Templer also stressed that Israel is excluded from joining the alliance and claimed that Britain would defend Jordan until it was attacked, whatever its source⁴².

However, the Prime Minister showed no hesitation, as it is the custom of the Mufti to be careful and patient when making decisions, and he did not favor issuing any decision except with the consensus of the members of his ministry, especially on an issue like this that has major repercussions among Jordanian and Arab public opinion⁴³. Based on this doctrine of the Mufti, it is not possible to approve an issue of this seriousness without consensus from the members of the ministry, especially since four of them are outside the country, two in Baghdad (Hazza al-Majali and Naeem Abdul Hadi) and two in London (Bshara Ghaseeb and Saeed Alaeddin), so the Mufti called Hazza al-Majali by phone. Asking him and Naeem Abdul Hadi to return as soon as possible in order to participate in the talks⁴⁴.

Although the Mufti believed from the beginning of the talks that Jordan's interest was to join the Baghdad Pact, he did not take any positive action in this direction, waiting for the arrival of Hazza al-Majali from Baghdad. Perhaps the reason for this is due to the following reasons:

- Hazza Al-Majali is a representative of the executive authority in the House of Representatives due to Saeed Al-Mufti's almost permanent absence from Parliament sessions, and since the Mufti believes that the main difficulty facing the issue of Jordan joining the alliance lies in the House of Representatives.
- Hazza's tribal weight is from the well-known Majali family in the south, which enables him to take a bold step like joining the alliance. While the Mufti belongs to the Circassian minority in Jordan, he was afraid that Arab patriots would accuse his group of being unpatriotic.
- Hazza's position was clear from the beginning, as he saw in it the interest of Jordan.
- The difference of age as Hazza, at 38, is full of enthusiasm and courage, while the Mufti's old age, who is 57 years old, and his poor health make him less enthusiastic and bold than Hazza⁴⁵. On the evening of the

same day, “Tumblr” met at the Royal Court with His Majesty the King, in the presence of Saeed Al-Mufti, Fawzi Al-Mulki, Minister of Court, Bahjat Al-Talhouni, Head of the Court, Farhan Shubilat, Minister of Defense, and Klopp. The King expressed the danger of Jordan joining the alliance, as this might lead to the Jordanian government losing control over opinion. General.

The ministers’ position on this alliance was a colonial ploy, and Jordan had no interest in it, regardless of the temptations. The view of the ministers - especially the West Bank ministers - was that the countries bordering Israel must have a unified position, and since Egypt and Syria reject the alliance, and if Jordan joins the alliance, this will cause a division between these countries, and that the main danger lies primarily in Zionism. (46)

On December 13, the ministers convened at the Prime Minister's Office to discuss joining the alliance. Despite Jordan's preparations, a cabinet split occurred when four West Bank ministers, the first to resign in 1955, including Naeem Abdel Hadi, Azmi Al-Nashashibi, Samaan Daoud, and Ali Hassan, resigned⁴⁷.

Additionally, the unity of Arab ranks is crucial for defending the Arab entity, and an alliance that conflicts with the position taken by Egypt and Syria is not reasonable. This led to a debate where West Bank ministers supported Naeem Abdel Hadi, East Bank ministers favored Hazza al-Majali, and the President, Mufti, sought consensus on the matter. This division became clear as the forces of the Arab world, particularly those surrounding Israel, must be united to maintain their unity⁴⁸. Also, there were conflicting accounts about the reasons for the resignation of the four ministers, but they generally came to express the position of the authorities that issued them regarding the alliance, and they can be divided into two parts:

3.1. The Narrative of Baghdad Pact Supporters:

- Hazza Al-Majali believes that the real difference between the Palestinian ministers and the rest of the government is that they resigned after consulting the Prime Minister of Egypt about the matter, and that this was after the Jordanian government took its decision to join the Baghdad Pact⁴⁹.
- Ahmed Al-Tarawneh believes that the resignation of the four ministers came after a meeting that took place between them and the Egyptian ambassador at his home⁵⁰.
- The Iraqi Commission believes that the Palestinian ministers threatened assassination in a secret message if they agreed to Jordan joining the Baghdad Pact, and they also became cowardly towards public opinion in general and the Palestinians in particular⁵¹.
- Eden mentioned in his memoirs, and some believed that the resignation of the ministers came at Egyptian instigation and they were bribed by Saudi Arabia. However, this statement has no evidence of truth⁵².

3.2. The Narrative of Those Who Rejected the Baghdad Pact:

It has been discussed in previous sections that the reasons given by Naeem Abdel Hadi when he and his companions went, in addition to the West Bank ministers, during the ministerial meeting on December 12, that they stressed that a quick decision is difficult to make because the decision to join the alliance

depends on fulfilling two conditions: the first is consulting the countries bordering Palestine. The second is to consult political leaders in Jordan. However, the king's intervention and pressure on the ministers to agree led Abdul Hadi to submit his resignation in the same session, and his companions stood in solidarity with him⁵³.

Al-Majali mentioned in his memoirs that Saeed Al-Mufti's government made a mistake; This is because she asked Templer to discuss the matter with the ministers to convince them of the validity of the charter and the benefits that Jordan would gain from joining the alliance. The original plan was for a negotiating delegation to hold talks in Jordan to reach results in the country's interest. However, news of the negotiations was distorted by the Jordanian street, leading to Minister of Public Works Naeem Abdel Hadi resigning. Al-Majali, along with his West Bank colleagues, saw this resignation as a call to divide the nation, especially since they were from the West Bank. This made the situation more critical, leading to the Mufti's government resigning and he being entrusted with forming a new government. The street's distortion of the negotiations led to the resignation of the Minister of Public Works and his colleagues⁵⁴.

At that time, the Prime Minister, resisted Templar's proposals due to a cabinet crisis, stating that he had reached the end of his term and extending beyond it would not be beneficial. He also reported to the British Foreign Office that he had reached the end of his term⁵⁵. The Mufti went up to the Royal Court to meet His Majesty the King, carrying with him the news of the resignation of the four ministers, stressing that this resignation meant that there was no quorum left in the Council of Ministers. He then returned to the Presidential House, and it did not take long until Bahjat Al-Talhouni, head of the Royal Court, arrived at the Presidential House. He carries two letters: the first he submitted to Saeed Al-Mufti, containing his dismissal, and the second to Hazza Al-Majali, containing his appointment⁵⁶.

3.3. Summary

This section provided detailed insights by dissecting into Saeed Al-Mufti's government into Jordan's internal debates over the Baghdad Pact, highlighting the cautious approach compared to predetermined stances. It highlights the importance of individual actors like Hazza al-Majali in negotiations and the pragmatic calculation of Jordan's approach. The resignations of West Bank ministers were a significant hurdle for the pro-Pact faction, threatening internal consensus. The primary sources' analysis through politicians' memoirs provide reconstructions of discussions and persuasive efforts that influenced Jordan's response to the Baghdad Pact. The section counters monolithic stances by presenting Jordan's response as contingent on domestic and external pressures, offering a nuanced portrayal of the complex deliberations.

4. The Third Demand: The Government of Hazza Al-Majali and The Baghdad Pact (December 15, 1955 - December 20, 1955).

Hazza Al-Majali had to form his government in circumstances that made the formation process very difficult. Al-Majali's attention turned to the House of Representatives, to form his government. Al-Majali took the initiative to consult 30 representatives and explained to them his future government's policy

aimed at including Jordan in the Baghdad Pact. However, the assembled representatives refused to participate with him in the plan. Ministry.

In this regard, Al-Tarawneh mentioned in his memoirs that he and Mustafa Khalifa met with Hazza Al-Majali before forming his government to discuss the position of the House of Representatives and which representatives would join the ministry. Al-Majali suggested entering the alliance, but the House refused. Mustafa Khalifa, a friend of Al-Majali, refused to join his ministry. Al-Majali asked the representatives to explain his opinion before consultations began. Ahmed Al-Tarawneh and Mustafa Khalifa contacted Representative Tawfiq Qattan's house, and after explaining Al-Majali's program, representatives refused to participate. Al-Tarawneh then informed Hazza Al-Majali that the representatives would not participate in the ministry and would not give it confidence if entering the Baghdad Pact was part of its program⁵⁷.

Al-Majali was able to form his ministry on December 15, and informed the members of his ministry of his future policy and the truth about the Templar discussions. He did not hide from them his intention to join the Baghdad Pact, and he took written pledges from them that they would not oppose him and accept the alliance. This measure was a precautionary measure for fear of us brewing. To him in the future, or the situation will happen again, and they will resign, as did the four Palestinian ministers who resigned from Saeed Al-Mufti's ministry.

Al-Majali issued a statement to the people about the story of the Templar talks after the attempt to join the alliance was no longer hidden from anyone, in which he explained the conditions, nature and history of the talks. He summarized the reasons that prompted Jordan to make this attempt, which is Jordan's need to amend the treaty with Britain and reduce its duration from Twelve years to four years, and the number of armed forces will increase, and Jordan will obtain modern weapons and combat aircraft, in addition to fixed funds to finance these forces, and that there will be economic aid to reconstruct the country and establish projects that reduce the country's dependence on foreign aid, and seek to get rid of the British leadership in the Arab army. Jordanian within four years⁵⁸.

Al-Majali began searching for financial support for his government, to make it successful. He contacted the Iraqi Chargé d'Affairs in Amman and informed him of the necessity of addressing the Iraqi government to implement the financial commitments it had promised during Al-Majali's visit to Iraq on December 11, 1955 AD. The government of Hazza Al-Majali also received British support, as the British ambassador instructed In Jordan to the British Ambassador in Iraq requesting that the Iraqi government support Majali's demands for the necessity of implementing the economic decisions at the Baghdad meeting⁵⁹. Following this Al-Majali has taken precautionary measures to confront any emergency that threatens the stability of his government, and these measures include:

- He issued a strong warning to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. He addressed the Cairo ambassador in Amman on "Voice of the Arabs" radio, attacking the Jordanian government. He considered this an interference in private Jordanian affairs. He addressed another warning to the Riyadh embassy in Amman, the Egyptian military attaché, and some... The Egyptian officers who entered Jordan under the pretext of monitoring the Muslim Brotherhood and began interfering in Jordanian affairs.

- Al-Majali, in cooperation with the Arab Army leadership, took some precautionary measures to maintain Jordan's internal security⁶⁰.

- Al-Majali demanded that Templar return to his country, and Templar subsequently returned to Britain, after agreeing with the Prime Minister to carry out the mission again, if the newly formed Jordanian government found itself in a position to resume negotiations, and neither Hazza Al-Majali nor his successor prime ministers were able to. from doing so⁶¹.

After forming his government, the first blow that Al-Majali received was from the Voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo, which launched a campaign of allegations of demonstrations and deaths and injuries in Amman and the rest of the Jordanian cities, and this did not happen until after this campaign ⁶². At that time, during the strong demonstrations, Al-Majali instructed against using force, aiming to follow a parliamentary democratic path. However, the people's resentment towards Parliament and its election system was the primary reason for this resentment.

Further, the people's demonstrations were triggered by dissatisfaction with the democratic method defined by Al-Majali's policy. The demonstrations would not have occurred if Parliament had represented the nation correctly. However, the severity of the situation led to the imposed curfew, resulting in Al-Majali's resignation and the dissolution of Parliament, which he was dissatisfied with as it only represented a small part of the people⁶³.

In addition, the atmosphere was tense and the people were fully aware of the dangers of aggressive alliances as a result of the awareness campaign launched by the Communist Party, as violent demonstrations began in Amman and the cities of Palestine. Yaqoub Al-Zayadin recalls that he went out in a demonstration against the Baghdad Pact, in which there were high school students and those who had political and youth tendencies and Merchants and teachers became extremely enthusiastic and gathered in front of the local authorities building, chanting the downfall of the Baghdad Pact, the supporters of the Baghdad Pact, the government and its president⁶⁴.

The Majali administration is reported to have lost the support of the people. A backlash against the administration and its plan to include Jordan in the Baghdad Pact was heard from the general public. As the unrest in the Jordanian street grew more intense, it eventually proved impossible to maintain control over the street in the midst of boisterous protests involving people from all across the country. Led by the communists, unrest erupted across the nation, and gangs started igniting conflict by setting private residences, government buildings, and foreign property on fire. Hussein was forced to impose a ten-day curfew after calling in the army to tackle this reality with force⁶⁵.

Meanwhile, a Saudi force of between one thousand five hundred and two thousand soldiers, reinforced by armoured cars, had arrived in the Al-Hafouq region (located on the southern border of Jordan), and the Saudis also began recruiting Bedouins in that region, as well as in the Al-Jaff region, which is not far to the east. From Amman, tempting the Bedouins to join the army by paying huge salaries according to local standards, amounting to twenty-five pounds a month. King Hussein described them by saying: "They are

using their money trying to corrupt the Jordanian people, while at the same time they are amassing military forces and warehouses on the country's borders." South⁶⁶.

Under these circumstances, it became clear that the Majali government must resign five days after its formation, for the following reasons:

- The events that took place in the city of Irbid. Reports reached the king confirming that the city of Irbid threatens to declare itself part of Syria if the government insists on joining the Baghdad Pact.
- Many memos were received rejecting the alliance and the existing government of His Majesty the King⁶⁷.
- A large number of employees and ministerial deputies threatened to submit their resignations if the government continued its insistence on joining the alliance.
- Government employees participate in demonstrations and declare a strike. The Minister of Public Works and Interior threatened to resign if Prime Minister Hazza al-Majali continued to insist on joining the alliance⁶⁸.

In light of these circumstances, his Majesty, in consultation with his Prime Minister and Army Commander, decided to have two options which included either suspend the constitution and establish a martial government to control demonstrators, which was not preferred. Instead, he decided to dissolve the House of Representatives and hold a new election, thereby resigning the government in accordance with the constitution, thus resolving the dilemma ⁶⁹. On December 19, 1955 AD, the King issued a royal decree dissolving the House of Representatives, On December 20, Al-Majali submitted his letter of resignation to His Majesty the King in order to make way for a new government to hold elections⁷⁰.

On December 20, 1955 AD, King Hussein assigned Ibrahim Hashem, President of the Senate, to form a transitional government whose primary mission was to prepare for parliamentary elections. The next day, corresponding to December 21, Amman, like the rest of the cities of the Kingdom, returned to its normal life, and thus the Baghdad Pact file in Amman was closed with Prime Minister Al-Rifai's statement that it is not the government's policy to join any alliances⁷¹.

However, The House of Representatives questioned the Council's dissolution legitimacy, arguing it did not meet constitutional conditions due to resignations of ministers, particularly the Interior Minister. The dissolution was signed by King Hussein and the Prime Minister, but the Minister's resignation remained, prompting an appeal to the High Council for Constitutional Interpretation⁷². On January 4, 1956 AD, the Supreme Council issued a decision stating that the dissolution did not meet the conditions stipulated in the Constitution due to the ministers submitting their resignations prior to the dissolution⁷³.

Tarawneh mentions this matter in his memoirs and says that the royal will to dissolve the Council did not meet the constitutional requirements, as the will to dissolve was signed by the King and the Prime Minister only, and there was no mention of the Minister of the Interior, who must sign the dissolution decree according to Article (40) of the Jordanian Constitution, so a number of members met. A senior member of Ahmed Al-Tarawneh's house wrote a memorandum to the king, which was signed by some members. Al-Tarawneh then asked to meet the king, who explained that the royal will to dissolve the

council violated the constitution. The king was the one who swore the oath to uphold the constitution, and the matter was put in his hands to study. The delegation left the palace, and Tarawneh met with Prime Minister Ibrahim Hashem, Vice President Samir Al-Rifai, and other ministers of the transitional government to discuss the matter⁷⁴.

The next day, Samir Al-Rifai was entrusted with forming his government, whose ministerial statement stated that Jordan would not enter into or associate with any new alliances, and that the Palestinian issue was the government's major issue, and that among the tasks of his ministry were to restore order, strike at the hands of the plotters of sedition, and arrest those found to have encouraged the demonstrations. and instigated it ⁷⁵. Tarawneh mentions in his memoirs in this regard that after the new government was formed headed by the powerful statesman Samir Al-Rifai, he called the National Assembly to continue its meetings.

On the morning of the session, a friend of Tarawneh asked him to ask Hazza Al-Majali, a member of the House of Representatives, not to attend a session due to potential attacks from extremist representatives. Tarawneh informed the representatives that Hazza has the right to attend and express his opinion without personal attacks or insults, as it violates the democratic parliamentary system. He emphasized that the interest of the country is paramount, and the members promised not to insult Al-Majali. Hazza attended the session, and some representatives spoke calmly and denounced the Baghdad Pact, while Hazza responded with a calm and bold statement. The situation highlights the importance of maintaining a democratic parliamentary system and respecting the rights of all members⁷⁶.

Al-Majali stated in the speech that he delivered: "I diligently wanted the Jordanian people to achieve a decent life in four years, and I wanted a broad plan for economic and social growth that would guarantee them a higher standard of living and a better society... and I wanted them to be protected from the Jews, guaranteed by a larger army and stronger and more powerful weapons." Even if one day Israel bows its head, the apostasy will be in its temporary home and it will be the day of salvation... Therefore, I wanted Jordan to highlight its noble Arab character, as its owner wanted it to be... the character of the country that pleases the friend and terrifies the enemy⁷⁷."

In his speech, he raised several questions, including: Is it true that the Baghdad Pact, if Jordan joins it, will be the bridge over which Israel crosses over us? The answer was that what is correct is other than all of this. Rather, there is a hidden force that seeks to strive in the country, and this hidden force is what turns general good into widespread evil and seeks the truth in vain. Therefore, he demonstrated the invalidity of the messages of this hidden force when it broadcasts that the Baghdad Charter will be the bridge over which Israel crosses to Jordan, based on its reading of the text of Article Five of the Charter, which is: "This Charter shall be open to accession by any country of the Arab League and other countries that It is concerned with the issue of effective peace and security in this region, which is fully recognized by both High Contracting Parties. So, where is the recognition of Israel from Jordan and Iraq?⁷⁸

In Al-Majali's opinion, the intention of Jordan's entry into the Baghdad Pact was a means to mobilize forces and achieve their aspirations in Palestine and Arab unity, as called for by Hussein bin Ali. He

suggests that if a plan is found to be flawed or harmful, those who see it as right should present a new policy to save the country, or abandon the charter and change their mind⁷⁹.

4.1. Summary

Assessing Hazza al-Majali's government formation and negotiations, highlighted pragmatic political calculations. It also highlights the role of figures like Ahmed al-Tarawneh in providing insights. This account also highlighted the rapid rise of protests due to external actors like Egypt and domestic communist opposition, threatening government control. The cabinet was divided, and Jordan's policymaking was limited by military, economic, and political factors. Al-Majali defended a pact to strengthen Arab causes like Palestine, but growing opposition made it difficult to maintain. The section highlights the complex contingencies faced during this period.

5. Jordanian Popular Reactions to The Baghdad Pact and The Failure of the Pact

The Jordanian Street was divided into two groups regarding its position on the Baghdad Pact: one supported the alliance and called for its entry, while the other opposed it. Each group had their own reasons and motives for adhering to their beliefs, explaining why the popular street joined the alliance despite the overwhelming discontent. This study aims to explain the views of each group and the evidence they relied on by reading the biographies of politicians who lived through the diaries of the event.

5.1. The First Requirement: Supporters of the Alliance.

The popular discontent began to spread across the Jordanian street, and demonstrations spread and spread throughout all regions. Politicians, employees, and professionals participated in them, and women participated and were partners with men. Interpretations of these demonstrations took many directions, including:

- His Majesty King Hussein blamed Cairo Radio for the demonstrations, accusing them of false accusations and preparing for them. Hazza Al-Majali echoed this view, referring to the "Voice of the Arabs" radio station and the Egyptian embassy's role in stirring up the masses. Al-Majali criticized Jordanian public opinion as foolish⁸⁰.

- Anthony Eden believes that incendiary Egyptian propaganda and Saudi money were behind these demonstrations, as these demonstrations coincided with the presence of a Saudi force that moved towards the southern border in Jordan and took advantage of the wave of anger in the Jordanian street by attempting to carry out military operations on the Jordanian border⁸¹.

However, it is also argued that the reasons that prompted Jordanian officials to join the Baghdad Pact were the Jordanian-British Treaty of 1948 needs amendment, with recommendations for increasing the Jordanian Armed Forces, obtaining modern weapons, combat aircraft, and funding, providing substantial economic aid, and eliminating British leadership in the Arab army within four years.

Additionally, Al-Majali believed that the Baghdad Pact would impose strategic consequences and military obligations on Jordan, limiting its freedom in international relations. Despite calls for financial aid, Arab countries showed no seriousness or sincere desire. Jordan needs to have a strong armed forces and an air

force to protect the vast skies. The most important issue is the removal of British leadership in the army and the removal of the then Chief of Staff, Klubb Pasha. The state's resources are insufficient for the budget, and Jordan's desire to remove the British leadership is paramount⁸².

5.2. The Second Requirement: Opponents of the Alliance.

The Soviets paid attention to the West's interest in the Middle East, so they went to exploit the West's mistakes. They supported the Arabs' feeling that the European countries were the ones who created Israel, and they are also the ones who continue to help it, despite their unwillingness to reach a solution that satisfies the Arabs. The Soviets helped in Pitting the Arabs against European countries continued the Western military and political presence in many parts of the Arab world, and the Arabs began to feel that the West was the barrier standing in the way of their independence and unity. The Russians began media campaigns denouncing the military alliances and then moved to military and economic aid and political support to some Arab countries⁸³.

Opponents of the alliance believe that these demonstrations came from the hearts of its participants, as they believed that the alliance aimed to drag the Arabs into imaginary hostility with the Soviet Union, pave the way for the liquidation of the Palestine issue, isolate Egypt and the Maghreb from the rest of the Arab countries, and divide the Arab world into camps. (84)

This team saw that the Baghdad Pact is an international alliance with an influence not only on Jordan but also on other countries such as the countries of the Levant (Egypt, Syria, Jordan) surrounding Israel, which prevents any country from being alone in making such a fateful decision regarding the final settlement of the Palestinian issue⁸⁵.

Opponents argue that the alliance aims to shift Arab attention from Israel's dangers to the Eastern bloc's, spreading corruption and discord among Arabs⁸⁶. The demonstrations, which included politicians, employees, and professionals, were popular and covered all societal classes, encompassing all parts of the Kingdom from north to south and east to west⁸⁷.

5.3. The Failure of the Baghdad Pact.

The Baghdad Alliance faced numerous defeats, weakened its foundations, and halted its movement. Egyptian propaganda opposed the alliance, believing Arabs needed a comprehensive system based on nation unity. Abdel Nasser, viewing the Baghdad Pact as a form of disguised colonialism, sought to undermine its pillars in the Arab world through various methods, causing the alliance to paralyze its movement. Jordan's refusal to join the alliance, the failure of the tripartite aggression against Egypt⁸⁸, and the Soviet Union's support for Egypt and Syria contributed to the decline of British influence in the Arab region and failure of Baghdad Pact⁸⁹⁹⁰.

The military coup took place in Iraq on July 14, 1958 AD, which ended the monarchy in Iraq and brought down the Baghdad Pact. The new republican regime led by Abdul Karim Qasim sent a letter to the embassies of the alliance countries (Britain, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) informing them of the change in the regime, which was his desire that Establishing close cooperation between his government and all

countries on the basis of friendship, and following a policy of neutrality and non-alignment with either the Eastern or Western camps⁹¹.

Thus, the alliance began to practice nothing significant in international politics except that it was a tool for economic and cultural coordination between the four countries. Under these circumstances, Iran officially withdrew from the alliance after the revolution took place in it in 1979. Turkey also announced its withdrawal from the alliance in the same year after the Turkish President's statement. Bulent Ecevit said that Turkey will put an end to the military alliance agreements⁹².

5.4. Summary:

The Jordanian street protests occurred from December 15, 1955, to December 21, 1955, involving all parts of the Kingdom. The Iraqi government adopted the Baghdad Pact to prepare for Soviet aggression and to replace the Iraqi-British treaty with a special agreement within the alliance. The Jordanian government attempted to join the Pact to ensure military assistance and eliminate the Jordanian-British Treaty, but failed due to public pressure. Arab countries also rejected the Baghdad Pact, despite their differences in reasons, leading to the fall of the alliance.

The media, particularly the "Voice of the Arabs" radio station, influenced the Jordanian street towards the Palestinian movement, portraying Jordan's accession to the alliance as abandoning the Arab issue of Palestine. Demonstrations began in the West Bank, possibly due to the resignation of Palestinian ministers and British colonial conspiracies. Many Jordanians, who received their education in neighbouring countries, adopted these ideas. Jordanian political parties, including nationalist, Islamic, Qatari, and Marxist trends, rejected the Baghdad Pact. Unrest broke out in the region, with the Arab Baath Party leading demonstrations with Egyptian funding, occupying buildings, and spreading mobs in the streets⁹³.

In an interview with communist doctor Yacoub Ziyadin, he recounts a demonstration in Karak organized by Baathists and communists, including Ibrahim Al-Habashna, calling for the fall of the alliance. Yacoub's arrest led to the dispersal of the demonstration, and he was taken to Karak prison⁹⁴. However, the demonstrations intensified in Amman, Jordan, and Palestine, leading to the resignation of the government and the cancellation of joining the movement. The government resigned and detainees were released⁹⁵. In Salt, demonstrators attempted to control government departments, but the army refused to implement Klopp's orders, citing King Hussein's personal order. Women stood alongside men in the demonstrations, and schools closed down in Nablus⁹⁶. In essence, The Baghdad Pact in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan came down under public pressure, and Al-Rifai eliminated the last attempt for Jordan to join any other alliances by announcing his government and rejecting the alliances. The demonstrations in Nablus and other cities led to the closure of schools and the resignation of the government⁹⁷.

6. Findings:

The analysis of Jordan's leadership's involvement in the 1955 Baghdad Pact through the primary memoirs of high officials in the policymaking process revealed that how the talks, lobbying, and opinion changes within Jordanian leadership influenced the kingdom's involvement in the accord. These memoirs highlight

tensions within government circles and different views on the issue, but also allow for socialization and learning from different perspectives. Political leaders like Abu Al-Huda believed the alliance appealed to the military and economic sector, while others held opposing views.

Further, the polarization of Jordan's diplomacy and internal political process during a key phase of regional realignment led to the resignations of several ministers. Pro-pact figures like Hazza Al-Majali supported joining the West Bank, while West Bank ministers, led by Naeem Abdel Hadi, opposed it. British efforts to influence Jordan included a mission by General Templer. By exploring the different perspectives during the Baghdad Pact negotiation this study offered novel insights on Jordan's diplomacy and internal political process, revealing calculations, arguments, and lobbying that influenced Amman's stance on the issue.

7. Conclusion:

In conclusion, this study examined Jordan's diplomatic efforts inside the Baghdad Pact, exposing complex discussions, disagreements, and shifting patterns of internal power. It draws attention to Jordan's precarious position as it negotiates challenges from the region while having limited control over important foreign policy matters. Jordan frequently had to modify its positions in reaction to uncontrollable circumstances, even though it made thoughtful decisions based on national interests. The study closes knowledge gaps about Jordan's limited capacity for decision-making throughout shifting regional alignments, emphasising the need of utilising distinctive primary sources to close knowledge gaps and offer a more comprehensive picture of outside effects on Jordan's diplomacy.

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- ⁸⁹ Governorate, Jordanian-British Relations, pp. 260-261.
- ⁹⁰ Seale, The Conflict over Syria, p. 306.
- ⁹¹ Al-Hasani, Baghdad Pact, p. 45.
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- ⁹⁵ Ziyadin, The Beginnings, p. 68.
- ⁹⁶ Defense, No. (6039), 12/21/1955 AD, p. 3.
- ⁹⁷ Defense, No. (6039), 12/21/1955 AD, p. 3.