



The Algerian Question in European Expansionist Policy, 1800–1830 AD

- Competitive Treaties and Conferences -

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Abstract: The Mediterranean basin has been a theatre of conflict between the Christian and Islamic worlds throughout history, owing to its strategic importance. In the 17th century, for example, the Algerian navy, operating under the banner of the Ottoman Empire, was at the height of its power. It focused its activities on acts of maritime jihad against Christian states in the Mediterranean basin, and played a major role in strengthening Algerian-Ottoman relations, particularly at the military level. This led to the creation of an international balance of power between the two shores of the Mediterranean. However, this military superiority made it a target for European states, which worked tirelessly to break its power and form an alliance against it. The Algerian navy experienced significant growth and development in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, but by the end of the seventeenth century, it began to show signs of weakening. In this regard, colonial rivalry seeped into the country; following the end of the European wars, a succession of European conferences were held to organise the new international order, such as the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of La Châpelle... and others, which subsequently affected Algeria's stability and international standing, making it a target for the modern European blocs that emerged following the defeat of Napoleon's campaign in Europe..

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1. Introduction

Algerian-European relations have historically exhibited an alternating pattern of tension and conflict, punctuated by periods of peace and harmony, with fluctuations depending on prevailing circumstances, particularly in Europe.

In instances of European dominance, Algeria exhibited signs of fatigue with the associated taxes, tributes and gifts, leading to declarations of disobedience, rebellion and non-compliance with the terms of the agreements. In response, European states frequently engaged in military campaigns and treacherous raids against Algeria.¹

Towards the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, Algeria seized the opportunity presented by the wars and strife stirred up by Napoleon both within and outside Europe, and extended its control over the Mediterranean. The organisation gained international recognition during periods of both peace and war. This led European states to submit to it, whether directly or indirectly. Evidence of this can be seen in their efforts to strengthen ties with Algeria and requests for its assistance.²

During this period, the Eyalet of Algiers maintained diplomatic relations with numerous European countries and the United States of America, treating them all equally. These countries appointed consuls to represent them and manage their interests with the Dey of Algiers. However, the Dey did not consider it necessary to have diplomatic representation, as it regarded itself as being in a state of perpetual war with Christian nations³, particularly following the imposition of tributes. These tributes formed the cornerstone

of the relationship governing Algerian-Euro-Mediterranean international relations and served as a form of individual protection for those nations. Algerian diplomacy was based on a set of principles and foundations in its foreign relations, including:

- Firstly: avoiding violence and the use of force, and refusing to yield to force whatever the consequences; this is confirmed by the correspondence exchanged between Algeria and France, and the existence of politely worded letters from the King or the Minister of the Navy, which proved highly effective in resolving problems⁴.

- Secondly: Algeria was keen to reject alliances and adhere to the principle of neutrality during European conflicts, to honour its pledges, and to abide by its commitments regardless of circumstances and international developments, whilst taking into account equality, religious tolerance and customs...⁵

In this paper, we have sought to focus on the central question that arises: how did European states deal with the Algerian issue during the period from 1800 to 1830 AD? Accordingly, we seek to answer a number of sub-questions, including: What were Algerian-European [major powers] relations like at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century? What were the most significant European conferences that discussed the Algerian question during the first half of the 19th century? What were the most significant outcomes of these conferences?- What was the Ottoman Empire's stance on the decisions of these conferences?

In carrying out this work, we adopted a descriptive and analytical historical approach, as this is a historical topic covered by a range of historical sources and references, which provided us with and described the historical facts; we analysed these in accordance with a research plan appropriate to the topic.

1- Algerian-European relations from the 17th to the 19th century:

Algerian-European relations during the reign of the Deys (1671–1830 AD) fluctuated between war and hostility on the one hand, and peace and security on the other, with the exception of Spain, which remained in a state of constant hostility and waged war against Algeria until the late 18th century AD, due to its invasion of the city of Oran until 1792 AD.

In his memoirs, Kat Kart states: 'In the second half of the eighteenth century, Algeria was bound by peace treaties with Great Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Venice and the Small Republic of Ragusa, As for the Russian Empire and Germany, the Dey adopted a stance of indifference towards them; he would await information from the Sublime Porte before taking a position on them. Consequently, the Algerian fleet did not capture any ships belonging to either of these two states, As for Portugal, Prussia, Naples, the Italian principalities and other cities that did not pay maritime taxes, Algeria was at war with them.'⁶

1-1: Algerian–French relations during the Ottoman period up to the first half of the 19th century:

Algerian-French relations have generally been characterised by a keen interest in maritime issues addressed within the context of maritime jihad, particularly prisoner ransoms and trade⁷, and these relations fluctuated, particularly during the era of the Deys. The origins of these relations date back to the sixteenth century, when France enjoyed trade privileges not granted to any other European nation; it maintained trading posts in the Eastern Beylicate (El Kala, Annaba and El Koul), and the company known as the 'Company of Africa' paid annual taxes for its activities to the Bey of Constantine, as it was situated within his territory, and to the Pasha in the capital; this was a meagre sum when compared to its revenues from coral fishing, and the export of grain to Europe,⁸, France's policy towards Algeria was shaped by local and international circumstances and fluctuations. Its consuls were highly competent and well-versed in their country's interests. Thanks to the gifts they presented on special occasions and the bribes they paid to win over government officials and influential figures, they succeeded in achieving their commercial objectives in particular, This meant that France did not even have to pay an annual tax to Algeria; indeed, it is likely that the total amount France paid to Algeria was greater than that paid by any other country⁹, This period was characterised by a combination of stability and conflict, despite the treaty signed between them on 11 March 1679, concerning the Bastion, which took place during the reign of the Dey Hussein

Pasha Mizomorto (1683–1688)¹⁰, France reneged on the peace treaty it had concluded with Algiers due to a dispute over the exchange of prisoners on 12 July 1682, and Algiers was subjected to military campaigns, and out of fear of an alliance between Algiers and England, particularly following the signing of a treaty between Algiers, England and the Netherlands in 1681 AD, France was compelled to conclude a peace treaty in 1684 AD¹¹

Tensions between them flared up once again; whilst Algeria insisted on continuing the war, France's situation did not allow it to do so, owing to the damage inflicted on its trade by the drought that had swept across its south, and its urgent need to import wheat, which prompted it to reach out to Algeria. It therefore instructed the director of the bastion, 'Desou', to propose the possibility of entering into a state of peace, which the Eyalet accepted, and the agreement was signed on 25 April 1684¹². This was followed by a new peace treaty in 1689 AD, following which France resorted to diplomatic means to resolve its problems and instructed its consuls to adopt a friendly tone with the Deys of Algiers, avoiding threats and the use of force. Consequently, the period between 1690 AD and 1790 AD witnessed a degree of stability, in order to avoid disruption to trade.¹³

As for the early eighteenth century, specifically during the reign of the Dey al-Hajj Mustafa Pasha (1700–1732)¹⁴, when France sought to persuade Algeria to side with it against the European alliance, these relations developed significantly towards the end of the 18th century and saw a relative improvement to some extent, in that, following the French Revolution of 1789, Algeria recognised the French Republic and granted the revolutionary government a conditional loan of one million francs in 1796, which was to be used to purchase grain from Algeria, and allowed it to use its ports for supplies due to the continental blockade imposed on the coasts of France. France was thus able to obtain food supplies directly from Algeria, on condition that it paid the price to the Algerian government. However, this arrangement changed later, after France turned to Jewish merchants, led by 'Bakri' and 'Bouchnaq', to make payments to Algeria on its behalf¹⁵. Consequently, the Jews came to play an influential role in Algeria's economy and foreign policy.

After Napoleon Bonaparte seized the island of Malta and expelled the Knights of St John from it, and proceeded to free the Muslim prisoners on the island, he informed the Dey of this humanitarian act through the French consul in Algeria, and the French administration sent a diplomatic note from Paris, which was very well received by the Dey despite the fact that France had occupied Egypt in 1798. However, the Dey, as the representative of the Ottoman Sultan and Britain, was ultimately compelled to declare war on France on 21 December 1798¹⁶. This was merely a symbolic gesture; the French consul and a number of French nationals were placed under house arrest for several weeks. They were subsequently released. Algeria had no intention of taking any hostile action against France, but merely sought to freeze diplomatic relations. The second measure involved the suspension of the French African Agency in eastern Algeria¹⁷.

1.2 Algerian–British relations:

Algeria's relationship with Britain was characterised by a mere exchange of interests and influence, particularly as Britain had always sought to disrupt and undermine Algerian-French relations through its consuls stationed in Algeria¹⁸. As for Britain, it had lost its naval supremacy; however, given the naval bases it had established in the Mediterranean and its recognition of the independence of the United States, the Algerian government both feared and respected it¹⁹,

This was due to its rivalry with France over the acquisition of concessions in Africa in general, and within Algerian territory in particular, during the 18th century.

We find that England imposed a total blockade on France, with the assistance of some European states, during the French Revolution of 1789, known as the 'Third Continental Blockade (1792–1793)', However, this effort failed following the intervention of the United States of America, which supplied France with its necessities²⁰, prompting Britain to alter its strategy towards France. It then sought the assistance of Algeria after intervening to resolve the Algerian–Portuguese conflict, and succeeded in brokering a truce between the two sides in 1793, thereby forcing the Algerian fleet to head for French ports²¹

1.3 Algerian–Spanish relations:

Unlike other European countries, Spain remained in a state of constant hostility and waged continuous wars against Algeria until the late 18th century, owing to Spanish control of the city of Oran until 1792. They also launched three naval campaigns against the city of Algiers with the aim of occupying it. The first campaign was led by General Aurélie, who attacked the city of Algiers on 31 July 1775; the campaign lasted 11 days and ultimately ended in a resounding failure, with the Spanish forces suffering defeat at the hands of the Algerians.²²

It was also forced to yield, particularly after realising that it was impossible to defeat Algiers; it therefore sought, through the Ottoman Empire, to persuade the Dey, Osman Pasha, to agree to negotiations with a view to concluding a peace treaty. However, the Dey rejected the peace proposal in its entirety, despite the insistence of the Spanish and, behind them, the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Spain resorted once more to military force, launching a second military campaign against the city of Algiers in 1783 AD under the command of Don Antonio, who arrived with his forces at the port of Algiers on the evening of 31 July 1783 AD, and began bombarding the city with cannons for 10 days; **however, the campaign failed due to the resilience of the Dey's forces and the people of Algiers, who succeeded in defeating them and driving them away for the second time²³**. This was the last time Spain attempted to occupy Algiers; it decided to cease the use of military force once and for all and opted for a diplomatic approach in its dealings with Algiers²⁴.

As a result, a peace treaty was concluded between Algeria and Spain in August 1785, which helped to restore calm and stability to the Mediterranean basin. Algeria then sought to liberate the city of Oran once and for all from Spanish occupation, and so organised a massive military campaign in which various sections of Algerian society took part alongside the Algerian-Turkish central army. After fierce battles, they succeeded in defeating the Spanish and driving them out of Oran, particularly after their massive fortifications were destroyed by the earthquake that struck Oran in October 1790 AD. Thus, the Spanish were finally expelled, Oran was officially liberated, and it was declared the capital of Western Balik in 1792 AD.²⁵

2. The most significant European conferences on Algeria – their repercussions - outcomes:

The strength of the Algerian navy and its waging of maritime jihad made it a target for European states, which had long sought to break its power and form an alliance against it, particularly as Algeria possessed a powerful fleet, which helped to create an international balance of power between the two shores of the Mediterranean.²⁶

By the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, given the new international circumstances that had turned the Mediterranean and the Atlantic into a theatre for the expansion of the Algerian navy's activities—particularly as it had treaties with France and Britain—and given that the navy no longer had competent commanders, merchants who had previously invested their money in purchasing shares in the ownership of Jihad al-Bahrī ships turned instead to foreign trade²⁷

To prevent any sign of weakness from seeping into its naval fleet, Algeria resorted to the use of force to the utmost extent, imposing annual tributes and demands for gifts on all Christian states whose ships entered the western Mediterranean, in addition to the escalating violence during clashes between the warring European states, each of which was attempting to secure Algeria's friendship. After the European wars had ended, colonial rivalry emerged and a series of European conferences were held to organise the new international order.

Following Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in Belgium in 1814, the leaders and monarchs of Europe organised a joint meeting to discuss ways of rapprochement, reconciliation and harmony, as the European states had suffered from conflicts and wars and their repercussions on their societies in various spheres of life; they were united by the Christian faith and the values of tolerance and peace it embodies.

The central issue raised by the Church, which united the views of Europe's politicians, was Algeria's naval activity, the aim of which was to put an end to the slavery and enslavement to which their Christian brethren had been subjected since the beginning of the modern era. This cause was championed by various societies and institutions, including: the French Fraternity and the Italian Palermo Society, by raising funds to ransom captives²⁸

It all began with a series of conferences and meetings attended by most of the major European powers, the most significant of which were:

-1-1 The Congress of Vienna, 1 October 1714 – 9 June 1815:

This conference is regarded as the first frank meeting between European states aimed at eliminating Algerian power in the Mediterranean, and was organised by the Emperor of Austria, who had received a request from Napoleon Bonaparte urging him to invite representatives of all the European states that had previously been involved in the conflict between the European alliances to attend a conference in Vienna, the capital of Austria²⁹. Around one hundred and forty delegations attended the conference³⁰, and numerous proposals and projects were put forward to combat the phenomenon and eradicate it once and for all, the most significant of which was the project of the Knights of St John³¹, which included a request to be granted a naval base in the Mediterranean to continue their activities against the Moroccan emirates³², the proposal by the Englishman Sir Sydney Smith³³, who was one of the most vehement opponents of the North African emirates; he stipulated the necessity of establishing a joint naval force to monitor and pursue piracy, and called for the replacement of North African governments with those sympathetic to European nations³⁴.

Other proposals included calling on the Ottoman Sultan to cooperate with European states in combating piracy, putting pressure on his North African provinces, and holding him accountable for this³⁵

The conference was not convened to bring about reconciliation between those states; the first meeting took place on 1 October 1814. Following Napoleon's second defeat, the Allied powers met once more on 9 June 1815 to lay the foundations for a settlement of the situation in Europe, and to address the convergence and divergence of interests amongst the ruling families.³⁶

However, this agreement concealed a disagreement amongst the Allied powers regarding the basis of the settlement: Austria was in favour of restoring peace and stability to the monarchs of Europe³⁷, whilst France attended the conference represented by its Foreign Minister Talleyrand who was keen to minimise losses by exploiting the victorious powers' desire to consolidate the foundations of the monarchy in France. The conference was not supposed to extend beyond the borders of the European continent, but ambitions exceeded those boundaries, particularly after the Knights of Malta – that Crusader order – submitted a memorandum calling for the suppression of piracy. As for Russia, it sought to subdue Algeria by establishing a land and naval force³⁸

At the conference, the Government of England also sought the right to inspect ships suspected of engaging in the slave trade, and raised several issues, including what they termed 'Algerian piracy', Christian slaves in Algeria, and the taxes paid by European states to the Algerian government. Admiral Sydney Smith had urged those present to recognise the need for European states to act collectively to destroy the naval power in the North African provinces and replace their current governments with others that were more civilised and in harmony with them. He even went further by proposing that the Ottoman Sultan be invited to cooperate with them by ceasing all supplies to the Dey's government in Algeria, arguing that the Sultan's intervention would serve to affirm the Sublime Porte's authority over the Dey of Algeria, who was not particularly compliant with the orders of the Ottoman government. Smith proposed the establishment of a European naval alliance under his command³⁹

The British Government, through its Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, objected

Her representative, Smith, proposed this out of fear that the Moroccan provinces might be subjected to a French invasion. He stated: 'Britain continues to adhere to its traditional policy of favouring the

preservation of the provinces, so that North Africa does not descend into a state of chaos that would enable France to subjugate it without difficulty'⁴⁰ , In general, following the Congress of Vienna and the mandate granted to it by the European powers – with the exception of France – British policy in the Mediterranean became one of the main obstacles standing in the way of Algerian naval activity, in addition to the fears of the Algerian rulers regarding the British navy, which was a stone's throw away from Algeria whilst stationed in Malta and Gibraltar⁴¹ .

France refused to participate in this alliance because, on the one hand, it bolstered British supremacy in the Mediterranean, and, on the other hand, because France was seeking to regain the trading posts in eastern Algeria which the British had seized in 1807 AD. The French delegate to the conference stated that the three deputy governors of the Ottoman provinces did not have the right to declare war or make peace⁴² .

As for Spain and Portugal, they too did not support this resolution because it was not in their own interests, whilst the other states showed little enthusiasm for the proposal, Thus, efforts to form a European bloc or alliance failed; even England itself was not enthusiastic about it, as it would lead to the weakening of the provinces, the spread of chaos within them, and make it easier for France to colonise them⁴³ . Furthermore, the other members of the conference recognised the danger of this and did not go along with England's ambitions.⁴⁴

Victorious and powerful Britain threw all its weight behind the conference, as the mistress of the Mediterranean, and so the conference entrusted it with taking measures to deter and punish, particularly after the conference recommended the formation of a joint naval fleet to strike the Moroccan provinces, and to compel them to release prisoners without ransom and to outlaw slavery. However, opinions differed and interests clashed, which prevented the formation of a European alliance against the provinces⁴⁵

1-1-2. Its Resolutions:

The Congress adopted a set of international rules, the most important of which were:

- Calling for the implementation of universal humanitarian principles to prevent the slave trade and to ensure freedom of navigation on international seas and rivers that flow through the territories of more than one state. ⁴⁶
- France was restored to its pre-Revolutionary borders and permitted to retain the city of Avignon, Alsace and Lorraine.
- France was surrounded by two states to isolate it, whilst Belgium was annexed to the Netherlands.
- Guaranteeing Switzerland's independence and neutrality on the international stage.
- Britain secured territorial gains, the most significant of which were the German province of Hanover, the German island of Heligoland, and certain islands such as Malta, Trinidad and Saint Lucia in the Caribbean, as well as Ceylon; it also affirmed its legitimate right to the Cape Colony in South Africa.
- The Austrian Empire seized Eastern Galicia, Tyrol, Salzburg and some northern Italian states such as Venice and Lombardy.
- Russia acquired most of Poland
- Prussia acquired Northern Saxony and a number of provinces in exchange for ceding large parts of Poland.
- The Italian states were granted the Kingdom of Sardinia, Piedmont, Nice and Genoa.
- The Bourbons were restored to the throne of the Kingdom of Naples and the Two Sicilies.
- The Pope was restored to the leadership of the Papal States.
- Austria acquired Lombardy and Venice.
- Norway was annexed to Sweden as compensation for the latter's loss of Finland to Russia.

- The enactment of the 'Federal Law', under which the 'German Confederation' was established; the aim of the Confederation was 'to maintain Germany's internal and external security'⁴⁷.

Returning to the Congress of Vienna and its resolutions, another meeting was held in Paris, where news reached them of the campaign waged by the United States of America against Algeria in 1815 AD, which encouraged the European states to reconsider their decisions. The first initiative came from the Netherlands, which sent its fleet to Algeria in July 1815 to renew its treaties with the country; however, the Dey Omar refused to negotiate until the Netherlands had paid its outstanding tributes, and the Congress recommended that Britain should take on the task of eliminating the Algerian pirates. The British government⁴⁸, led by Lord Acmoth, began preparing for a campaign against Algeria. At that time, the British fleet appeared in the port of Algiers on several occasions, signalling that Britain was biding its time to carry out the mission. Faced with this threat, the Dey Omar was compelled to send a letter to Sultan Mahmud II on 15 May 1815, in which he informed him of the movements of the European fleets in the Mediterranean, their hostile intentions towards Algiers, and the need to reinforce Algiers with troops and weapons.⁴⁹

In short, all parties to the conference agreed to prohibit piracy and slavery, and to endeavour to put this into practice, albeit individually; this is what England applied against Algeria, as it harboured ambitions to occupy Algeria by launching a military campaign, which was subsequently repelled.

As the issue of security in the Mediterranean was one of the most pressing concerns facing the Christian nations, led by England, the states involved in the matter convened the Congress of London in 1816 AD; however, the decisions and practical measures adopted failed to curb piracy, particularly Algerian piracy, in the Mediterranean. Consequently, this issue was raised once again at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

1.2. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 30 September–21 November 1818:

Following the failure of the parties to the Congress of Vienna in 1815 to unite their efforts, their inability to agree on a practical plan of action to eradicate piracy in the Mediterranean, and the impossibility of collectively implementing their proposals on the ground⁵⁰, they were brought together once more at a meeting in Aachen, Aachen-La Chapelle, Germany, on 30 September 1818,⁵¹ Attendees included the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia; representing Prussia was Metternich; representing Austria was Nesselord; representing Russia was Kapodistrias; and from England were Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, Count Prottstorf-Hardeburg, and the Duke of Richelieu, Prime Minister of France⁵², What is particularly noteworthy about this conference is France's accession to the de facto world government⁵³

The conference took place against a backdrop of tension, particularly following the failure of the London Conference, Exmouth's campaign against Algeria in 1816, and the Algerian fleet's resumption of operations after having been burned and destroyed; all of which prompted European politicians to refer the issue of piracy to the forthcoming summit and to settle it once and for all⁵⁴

The conference put forward a series of demands, foremost among which was a call for France to withdraw Allied forces from its territory without waiting for the five years stipulated in the Second Treaty of Paris, and for the Allies to allow France to join the European Group⁵⁵. It also called for the formation of an European alliance to eradicate piracy in the Mediterranean.⁵⁶

Following lengthy discussions and deliberations, the conference participants were unable to agree on a joint action plan against the North African states⁵⁷, or to take decisive action to resolve the issue at its root; they merely issued a strongly worded statement or warning to the states accused of piracy, and tasked the representatives of France and England – given their considerable influence with the Dey of Algiers⁵⁸ – with delivering a warning to cease piracy and slavery, accompanied by a threat to use force against Algeria in the name of the conference, Russia showed a tendency to join the European force to deter piracy in North Africa, which aroused the fears of both Britain and France, and prompted an attempt to keep it away from the warm waters⁵⁹

In accordance with this, the fleets of both nations appeared off the coast of Algeria in 1819 and issued an ultimatum to the Dey Hussein, demanding that he issued an official document acknowledging the abolition of the system of slavery in Algeria and ensuring that foreign ships would not be subject to search⁶⁰.

In order to inform the Moroccan authorities of the conference's decision, the British Vice-Admiral Froma Nittel and the French Admiral Count Jorian de La Gravière travelled to Algiers in July 1819⁶¹, and were received by the Dey 'Hussein' on 5 September 1819. The most significant points of the statement and warning were as follows: "The nations assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle have resolved, without any possibility of retreat, to put an end to the system of piracy... and if the provinces persist with this system, which is hostile to peaceful trade, they will inevitably provoke the general alliance of all European nations against them..."⁶²

He regarded the letter as a mere 'what if' scenario and refused to reply, expressing his astonishment at the European states' undertaking of this endeavour, which he considered misplaced, as Algeria was in a state of complete peace with all European states. In view of this, Dey Hussein did not stop there but ordered an intensification of naval activity.⁶³

He also informed them that his country categorically refuses to allow its vessels to be inspected, except by countries with which Algeria maintains good relations, and that he would continue the war against those who refuse to establish good relations with Algeria. The two representatives then left Algeria for Tunis and Tripoli respectively, having succeeded in making threats against them⁶⁴, unlike Algeria, which did not yield to those threats; consequently, the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference failed to achieve its objectives. Thus, the alliance of European states against Algeria collapsed, and each European country returned to resolving its issues with Algeria individually, as we see in England's campaign against Algeria in 1824 AD.

2- The Ottoman Empire's stance on the European conferences concerning Algeria: 1800-1830 AD

The Ottoman Empire regarded the Vienna Conference's consideration of the issue of the Moroccan provinces as a direct interference in its affairs. Sultan Mahmud II feared that European powers, led by England, might encroach upon the three provinces, so he ordered that his ministers be consulted on the possibility of sending an envoy to Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli to warn them of the impending dangers. The envoy, Ahmed Agha, was dispatched to the three provinces. When the Algerians learnt of the European plans and realised that there was no alternative but to address the grave situation, they welcomed the Ottoman envoy and demonstrated their obedience to the orders by refraining from attacking ships of

countries that maintained good relations with the Sublime Porte⁶⁵ also complied with the Sultan's request to release fifty Greek prisoners, and with increasing Russian pressure on Ottoman territories and the transformation of French and British privileges – alongside the weakening of the Ottoman Caliphate – into historically acquired rights within Ottoman territories, and the alliance of European states against the provinces of the Ottoman Caliphate, foremost among them Algeria, during the Congress of Vienna, which ostensibly aimed to abolish 'slavery', but whose underlying aim was the elimination of these provinces, which had come to constitute an obstacle to the progress of European states⁶⁶.

Neither the Congress of Vienna (1815 AD) nor the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818 AD) were favourable to the Ottoman Caliphate, particularly the Algerian Eyalet; among their consequences was the unification of Europe to confront what it termed 'Algerian piracy' and the adoption of a policy of pressure against Algeria⁶⁷

Conclusion:

The development of contemporary international organisations can be traced back to the European alliance, which pioneered a new diplomatic approach, laying the foundations for a series of conferences. This accord established a precedent in Europe since the advent of nationalism, by establishing an international parliament that assumed the responsibility of addressing prevailing political challenges and crises, irrespective of their nature. The accord further fostered awareness of the imperative for international

cooperation, particularly in the context of modern colonial campaigns, exemplified by the alliance centred on Algerian naval activity in the Mediterranean. We may draw the following conclusions:

-The Congress of Vienna in 1815 is widely regarded as the de facto beginning of Europe's colonial history, as well as a new chapter in friendly relations between European nations. The repercussions of this for weaker peoples were significant and ultimately led to the demise of the idea of popular sovereignty over the thrones, allowing hereditary monarchies to reassert their dominance.

-With regard to Algerian-European relations, tensions had been mounting since the end of Napoleon's campaign in Europe and the emergence of a policy of reconciliation amongst European states, as embodied by the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. The rulers of Algeria did not accept this development. As a result, they did not utilise diplomacy and expertise to manage crises in the face of evolving Euro-Mediterranean circumstances. Instead, they maintained their commitment to the principle of employing naval force.

- Around the year 1800, the policy of European blocs and alliances emerged, and Algeria provided a valuable lesson during the Exmouth campaign of 1816. This was repeated in 1824, followed by the Battle of Navarino in 1827, culminating in the French siege.

-From the reaction of the Eyalet of Algiers to European developments, it is clear that using violence or threats to address crises is ineffective when confronted with the dominant European powers that control all areas.

-Algeria failed to recognise the shift in the balance of power in favour of the major European powers, which subsequently used this as a justification for their attacks and military campaigns against Algeria by criminalising and prohibiting the practices of the Algerian navy.

It is an irrefutable fact that the European blocs achieved their objective, and Algeria was subjugated by French colonial rule in 1830, whilst the Ottomans withdrew, leaving it to face the threat posed by the northern Mediterranean.

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