



An Intervention Entitled: The Position of the Algerian Governors on the Tunisian Familial Dispute on the Authority between 1728-1756 A.D/ 117-1141 H

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Abstract: This research paper treats one of the important topics, categorized by the Mediterranean Algerian Relationships during the Ottoman era, which resembled the Algerian governors' position on the Pasha Crisis that stormed the Hussaini governance in Tunisia during the first half of the 18th century.

Therefore, what is the nature of this familial dispute that emerged in Tunisia between 1728 and 1740 A.D.? What is the position of the Algerian governors on this conflict? And how was the impact of the war on the political relationships between Algeria and Tunisia?

We aim to figure out the nature of the political relationships that linked Algeria to Tunisia where both of them are Ottoman eyalets in this research paper, as well as standing on the extent of the ability of Algeria and its rulers to decide on declaring war or peace based on what its internal and external interests dictate during the period of eyalets.

Keywords: Algerian governors, political relationships, Tunisia, 18th A.D/ 12th H., The Pasha Crisis.

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INTRODUCTION:

The inter-political relationship of Algeria during the Ottoman Era with the Tunisian eyalet is considered one of the most important historical topics, but it is not a well-explored subject. Therefore, our intervention focuses on shedding light on one of the components of this relationship, where Algeria and its governors had a huge influence on it, which is their position from the inner conflict among the ruling Tunisian Husaini family members, known as "The Basheya Dispute", which continued for a long period, leading Tunisia to division into two sections where the conflict revolved around them for more than twenty years, affecting Tunisia, as well as Algeria.

Therefore, what are the causes of this Tunisian familial conflict? And what is the position of the Algerian governors and the Constantine beys on it? How did these governors influence tipping the balance in favor of one side over the other? To what extent did Algeria have the complete freedom in deciding whether to engage in the war or declare peace? And what are the consequences of this war on Algeria and Tunisia?

1- THE BASHEYA DISPUTE'S DEFINITION:

During the period between 1728 and 1740, Tunisia experienced a civil war that was ignited inside the royal court among the ruling Husaini family members¹, then moved to the street and divided Tunisia into two parts; the first part stood with the founder of the Husaini ruling, "Husain ibn Ali."² The second part stood with his nephew "Ali Pasha" who rebelled against his uncle; hence, the dispute was named "The Basheya Dispute".

Its origins go back to "Muhammad", the older brother of the "Bey Husain ibn Ali", who had a son named "Ali". The latter got a special upbringing from his uncle "Hussain ibn Ali" who did not have children; therefore, he adopted him and showered him with abundant care and affection. In 1118 AH (1706 AD), Husain appointed "Ali" as the leader of Amhal,³ whom he would lead during summer and winter at the age of no more than seventeen. He was preparing him for rule and grooming him as his heir. However, Husain later married a Genoese concubine who gave birth to his children: Muhammad, Ali, Mustafa, and Fatima⁴.

When Husain's son "Muhammad" grew older, he nominated him for succession after consulting some scholars⁵ and appointed him to gather taxes (i.e., leading the Amhal) instead of his nephew "Ali Pasha". Although the Bey "Husain ibn Ali" requested the position of Pasha for his nephew from the Sublime Porte — and his request was granted — Ali Pasha accepted reluctantly, and his heart became full of grudge against his uncle and his sons. He deeply resented being removed from authority and leading al'Amhal; consequently, rebelling against his uncle and took refuge in the "Waslat"⁶ mountain. From that moment, he declared the Husainid-Bashiyan Civil War over power which was divided into two stages; the first one extended from February 1728 AD until August 1729 AD, and ended with the victory of "Husain ibn Ali" and the flight of his nephew to Algeria, where he stayed for seven years⁷. He rebelled again with the help of Algerian rulers in 1735 AD, and the civil war was renewed until 1740 AD, succeeding in seizing power from his uncle and eliminating him⁸.

It is worth mentioning that the Algerian rulers did not get involved in the first stage of this war and were only distant observers. However, in the second stage, they engaged in the war. So, what is the reason behind this?

2- THE FIRST INVOLVEMENT OF THE ALGERIAN RULERS IN FAVOR OF "ALI PASHA" 1148AH/ 1735 AD:

"Ali Pasah" managed to form friendships that enabled him to watch the course of events when he settled in Algeria in 1729 AD. He took advantage of the turmoil relationship between the Algerian rulers and his uncle who was accused of being reluctant to provide aid to Algeria to liberate Oran City from the Spanish again in 1732⁹ AD. He also stopped paying money that he had previously committed to in the era of the Dey "Kour Abidi"¹⁰ between 1742-1732 AD in exchange for keeping his nephew "Ali Pasha" imprisoned in Algeria and preventing him from organizing a rebellion against him, knowing that Algeria was going through financial distress due to the decline of the naval revenues on one hand, and the costs of the war against the Spanish colonial rule on the other hand¹¹.

All of these circumstances motivated "Ali Pasha" to go to the Algerian ruler "Ibrahim the Great" (1732-1745 AD) and make generous and tempting offers to him to expel his uncle from power. These offers included his commitment to allegiance to Algeria, paying an annual tax of 200,000 écus, covering the costs of the campaign, estimated at 1,000 piasters¹² per stage, and pledging to give a sum of money to the Dey and the army commanders after he had taken control of Tunisia. He also pledged to pay a quantity of wheat to the rulers of Algeria.

Despite the efforts made by "Hussein ibn Ali" to prevent this Algerian military campaign in support of his nephew, he offered, through his friend, the Bey of Constantine, "Hussain Kalian", to pay a lucrative sum of 50,000 piasters in exchange for peace between the two provinces. He also asked the Sublime Porte to mediate this difficult issue, but his efforts failed¹³.

Since Ali Pasha succeeded in his endeavor, the Dey of Algiers, "Ibrahim the Great", ordered a military campaign towards Tunisia to support him against his uncle, "Hussain ibn Ali", in Dhu al-Hijjah 1147 AH/May 1735 AD. The campaign consisted of approximately 2,000 regular soldiers and 1,000 men from Ali Pasha's followers who were present in Algeria. On their way to Tunisia, the Bey of Constantine, "Hussain Kalian", joined them with a group of 1,000 soldiers, forced to do so because of the friendship that bound him to "Hussein ibn Ali"¹⁴. However, when politics plays its tricks, there is no room for men friendships.

It was Ali Pasha's good fortune that the alliances he had forged with the sheikhs of the major tribes in eastern Algeria served him well in times of need. Alongside him in this campaign were "Sheikh Bouaziz

bin Nusayr”, one of the most important sheikhs of the “Hanansha tribe”; Ali Pasha's son-in-law “Bournan”, sheikh of the “Biban Arabs”; “Muhammad bin Abi Al-Dhiaf”, sheikh of the “Aures Arabs”; and “Sheikh Farhat bin Rajraja”, sheikh of the “Zab Arabs¹⁵”. “Ali Pasha” had made alliances with all of these sheikhs during his flight to Algeria in 1729 AD¹⁶, bound together by intermarriages and common interests that were in Ali Pasha's favor, and he made good use of them and directed them against his uncle “Hussein ibn Ali”.

This military campaign succeeded in wresting power from “Hussein ibn Ali” in Tunisia after a battle between the two sides near the city of Tunis—at a location called Samanga in Zaghouan, near the Wadi Milian. The battle took place in Rabi' al-Thani 1148 AH/September 1735 AD. “Hussein ibn Ali” was shot in the hip, and his forces dispersed. He fled with his sons to Kairouan, where they fortified themselves for five years. After several battles, “Yunus”, son of “Ali Pasha¹⁷”, succeeded in eliminating “Hussein bin Ali” in Kairouan on Friday, Safar 6, 1153 AH/1740 AD. His sons fled to Algeria¹⁸, and thus, power in Tunisia was established under “Ali Pasha”. Several observations and conclusions can be drawn from this Algerian campaign against Tunisia:

- The intervention of the Algerian rulers in Tunisia in 1735 AD in the internal affairs of Tunisia and their support for “Ali Pasha” against his uncle, came in response to a request from one of the parties to the Tunisian conflict, namely “Ali Pasha”. They were neither the initiators nor the first to initiate this war; a similar pattern would later be repeated in the second intervention.

- The Algerian campaign in 1735 AD against Tunisia was successful in wresting power from “Hussein bin Ali”, whose positions toward the Algerian rulers had changed, and he paid the price for this with his position of rule. In return, they brought his rival and nephew, “Ali Pasha”, to power in exchange for his commitment to his previous pledges.

- The Algerians returned after the success of this campaign, carrying the spoils they had captured from Hussein bin Ali's camp, in addition to the money and gifts they had received from “Ali Pasha”, which were estimated at approximately 1.5 million piasters, a huge sum at the time, equivalent to the load of 35 mules.

- The Algerian military campaign began on October 6, 1735, with the return to Algeria before the final elimination of “Hussein bin Ali” and his sons. “Ali Pasha” offered them 50,000 riyals¹⁹ in exchange for their killing him. However, the Algerians rejected the offer and returned to Algeria.

- This campaign ushered in a new era of Algerian military interventions against Tunisia, which had ceased thirty years earlier, in 1705.²⁰

- This campaign proves that the Algerian rulers' interference in Tunisian affairs was not primarily to impose political control, but rather out of a dire and urgent need for funds. “Ali Pasha”, with his intelligence, was able to forge alliances with several major tribes located on the Algerian-Tunisian border, such as the “Hanancha, the “Aures” tribes, and the “Arabs of Zab”, who were among his most ardent supporters and aides in his campaign against his uncle in 1735. These tribes, especially the “Hanancha”, also played a significant role in stoking conflict between the two provinces from time to time, primarily to serve their personal interests, not the interests of the two eyalas.

3- THE SECOND ALGERIAN INTERVENTION IN FAVOR OF HUSAIN IBN ALI'S CHILDREN: DRING 1746 AND 1756 A.D:

Although the civil war in Tunisia stopped after the killing of “Hussein ibn Ali” in 1740 AD, and Ali Pasha's rule was stabilized for more than ten years, this period of stability did not last long. Political relations between the rulers of Algeria and Tunisia deteriorated again for reasons that will be mentioned later. The military conflict between the two states was renewed, as the rulers of Algeria directed two military campaigns towards Tunisia in order to seize power from “Ali Pasha” and grant it to the sons of “Hussein bin Ali”. The first campaign was in 1746 AD, but it did not complete its mission for several reasons. Then came the second campaign in 1756 AD, which succeeded in its endeavor and ended Ali Pasha's rule forever. The following is a brief presentation of the details of the two campaigns.

a. The False²¹ Algerian Expedition of 1159 H / 1746 A.D:

We previously mentioned that the ruler of Algeria, "Ibrahim the Great", helped "Ali Pasha" seize power from his uncle in 1735 AD in exchange for financial obligations he had pledged. However, when "Ali Pasha" was established as ruler of Tunisia, he began renegeing on his promises and procrastinating in fulfilling them. He also refused to pay the financial tax due²² since 1158 AH/1745 A.D. As a result, relations between the two provinces deteriorated once again. This was in addition to other factors that contributed to the escalation of the situation to the point of war, namely:

- "Ali Pasha" deployed his spies and agents in Constantine, relaying to him every detail, both large and small. He even managed to infiltrate Bey Hussein's council through his chief scribe, "Ali Abboud", who was discovered and killed by the Bey of Constantine. He also managed to infiltrate Bey Hussein's council through "Ali al-Hattab", a close associate of the Bey of Constantine²³.

- "Ali Pasha" also asked "Ibrahim al-Saghir", the ruler of Algiers (ruled 1745-1748), to kill his cousins, "Hussein ibn Ali", who had taken refuge in Algeria after their father's defeat. However, "Ibrahim al-Saghir" refused, considering it a betrayal due to the friendship and affection he had with Hussein ibn Ali's sons, "Muhammad", "Ali²⁴", and "Mahmoud".

In response, "Ali Pasha" plotted a coup and revolt against "Ibrahim al-Saghir". He contacted "Hajj Muhammad ibn Kour Abdi", who was residing in Egypt, incited him to revolt, and promised to support him. However, the ruler of Algeria learned of this through his agents in Egypt and wrote to the ruler of Tripoli, ordering him to eliminate "Hajj Muhammad ibn Kour Abdi" as he passed through Tripoli. This was accomplished, however, and "Ali Pasha" failed to implement his plan to destabilize Algeria²⁵.

- In order to exert pressure on "Ali Pasha", the rulers of Algeria continued to receive all his opponents, starting with his cousins, then a large group of their followers and supporters, and ending with a group of Turkish-Tunisian soldiers led by their commander, "Ali Bahlawan".

They had revolted against "Ali Pasha" in 1743 AD due to his oppressive policies and the increasing number of "Zuwara²⁶" soldiers around him. They therefore took refuge in Algeria, which greatly upset "Ali Pasha" and caused his relationship with the rulers of Algeria to become strained, escalating to the point of war²⁷.

It is worth noting that the sons of "Hussein bin Ali" did not spare any effort in knocking on all doors in order to win hearts to support their cause, and this coincided with the desire of the Dey of Algiers, "Ibrahim the Great", who was hindered by old age and illness to help²⁸ them in regaining the rule of Tunisia, so he recommended his nephew and son-in-law who succeeded him, "Ibrahim al-Saghir", to help them. Indeed, he ordered a military campaign against Tunisia in 1159 AH / 1746 AD, which gathered the sons of "Hussein ibn Ali" and their followers, accompanied by the soldiers of Algeria. They were joined on the way by the district of Constantine, led by the Bey, "Hassan Ashi", and the "Hanansha" tribe, who were related by marriage to "Ali Bey ibn Hussein ibn Ali". Thus, the Algerian campaign arrived. Accompanied by the sons of Hussein bin Ali, he marched to the border region of "El Kef" on 10 Jumada al-Ula 1159 AH (June 2, 1746 AD).²⁹

However, this campaign limited itself to besieging the city of "El Kef", which was difficult to attack due to the military reinforcements that had increased its strength. "Ali Pasha" had supplied it with six hundred elite Turkish soldiers, a thousand "Zuwara" soldiers, and a number of "Sabayhiyya³⁰" cavalry.

Despite repeated attempts and artillery bombardment that lasted for about two months between the two sides, the assault on the city of "El Kef" proved impossible due to the impregnability of its walls and the failure of attempts to breach it by planting a mine. What made the task even more difficult was the spread of the epidemic among the Algerian army, in addition to the political penetration that "Ali Pasha" had effected among the Algerians. He was able to learn everything that was going on in the tent of the Bey, "Hassan Ashi", through his spy, "Ali al-Hattab", who was one of his close associates. He thus exploited this difficult situation to his advantage, sending "Ashi Hassan" a messenger to tempt him with money and gifts to lift the siege of "El Kef" and return the campaign to Algeria.

He also worked to win over the "Hanansha" tribe to his side, knowing their importance. He succeeded in doing so, and wrote to Bey "Hassan Ashi", the Dey of Algiers, to convince him of the need to cancel this

campaign, citing the spread of the epidemic as a convincing reason. He noted that the Dey of Algiers was in dire need of this army due to the dangers surrounding Algiers, including a Danish naval attack on the city, in addition to the revolt of the Kouloughlis of Tlemcen against Ottoman rule. Therefore, he agreed to cancel the campaign and ordered its return. The army began leaving the "Kef" region in Rajab 1159 AH/July 1746 AD. For this reason, Tunisian sources describe it as "the danger of false Algeria." This withdrawal had a profound impact on the sons of "Hussein ibn Ali", and his son "Mahmoud" died in Constantine as a result - in anger, sadness, and grief over the disappointment - and was buried there³¹.

b. The Second Algerian Campaign to Support the Sons of Hussein bin Ali in 1169 H/1756 A.D:

The Political relations between the two states stabilized somewhat during the reign of Dey "Muhammad ibn Bakir", who ruled Algeria from 1748 to 1754. He rejected any interference in Tunisian affairs and was inclined toward peace, favoring reconciliation between the two countries³². However, a series of events brought relations between the two sister states to the brink of war and paved the way for the Algerian army's campaign in 1756 to support the sons of Hussein ibn Ali. These events included:

- The governor of Tunisia, "Ali Pasha", launched an attack on the border³³ tribe of the "Namamsha", due to their failure to pay taxes in exchange for their shopping in Tunisia. In 1164 AH/1750 AD, they also attacked the Hajj pilgrimage caravan. "Al-Fasi" and his looting, so they raised their complaint to "Ali Pasha", who promised to recover their money and sent a message to the "Namamsha" with a group of their notables asking them to return what they had stolen, but they refused and arrested the envoys. Therefore, he attacked them in a great military campaign and scattered them and seized their money. He also directed his son "Suleiman" to the "Qamar" region in "Wadi Souf" and ordered him to cut down the palm trees of "Azouz bin Amara bin Dalia Al-Razqi", who was one of the followers of the sons of the Bey, "Hussein bin Ali"³⁴.

Although this raid had caused great resentment among the Dey of Algiers, "Muhammad ibn Bakir", he did not show any strong reaction against this attack that the "Namamsha" tribe was exposed to in its own home. Perhaps the reason for this was his preoccupation with fortifying the city of Algiers, which was threatened by a European Crusader campaign throughout the period from 1749 AD to 1752 AD. This is what prevented him from responding³⁵, or perhaps because of the shameful act that this tribe committed, which was the attack on the caravan of pilgrims to the House of God. He saw this as a punishment. They deserve it.

This is in addition to Ali Pasha's reception of an Algerian military camp on his lands, numbering between two and three hundred, charged with collecting taxes in the Beylik of Constantine. They killed their commander, seized vast sums of money, and fled to Tunis in March 1752. The aforementioned "Hanancha" tribe also fled to Tunis to avoid paying taxes, creating a deficit in the usual tax revenues³⁶.

Despite the Bey of Constantine's repeated correspondence with the ruler of Tunis regarding the "Hanansha" tribe's response and the "Askar" neighborhood, or the payment of a sum of money as compensation, Ali Pasha's responses were always negative and provocative, due to his disdain for the Bey of Constantine, "Hassan Azraq Aina", who had previously³⁷ been a cook for his uncle, "Ali Bousbaa"³⁸.

In response, in the fall of 1754, "Hassan Azraq Aina" launched a lightning attack on the "Hanansha" tribe in Tunisian territory, killing many of them and driving away their livestock. Despite this punitive campaign in Tunisia, "Ali Pasha" did not respond with a similar campaign. Instead, in October 1754, he sent one of his officers laden with gifts to the Dey of Algiers, "Muhammad ibn Bakir", to win his favor and dissuade him from launching a military campaign against Tunisia³⁹.

- At the same time, Algeria was also filled with opponents of "Ali Pasha", who had taken refuge there, beginning with the sons of "Hussain", "Muhammad" and "Ali", along with a large number of their supporters, especially those who had joined them after the failure of the 1746 campaign. Fearing for themselves from the brutality of "Ali Pasha", they fled to Algeria, as did his son "Yunus", who disobeyed and revolted against his father "Ali Pasha" in 1752 AD, accompanied by a large group of his supporters. When his revolt failed, he moved to Constantine and settled there with his followers, hoping for the help of the rulers of Algeria⁴⁰. Despite Ali Pasha's persistent attempts to persuade the ruler of Algiers, "Muhammad ibn Bakir", to eliminate his opponents—his son and cousins—or to send them to Tunisia to carry out the operation

himself, he was unsuccessful in his endeavor. This was despite his friendship with the former Bey of Constantine, "Ashi Hussein", known as "Hassan Bouhenk", who died in 1753 and ruled Constantine for seventeen years. He also had a close relationship with the treasurer of Algiers, Ali, whom "Ali Pasha" hoped would establish a hereditary rule in Algeria similar to that of Tunisia.

This treasurer sought to launch a rebellion against the Dey, "Muhammad ibn Bakir", but he failed, and the Dey's companions were killed on a single day in late 1754. With their deaths, "Ali Pasha" lost hope of finding friends or allies in Algeria who would turn a blind eye to his actions⁴¹. "Ali Bousbaa" (1754-1766), who was well-versed in the country's affairs, took control of Algeria. His nephew, "Hussein Azraq", appointed him Bey of Constantine. The enmity between the rulers of Algeria and "Ali Pasha" deepened. The Dey, "Ali Bousbaa", along with the Bey of Constantine, decided to launch a major military campaign against Tunis, led by the latter, to support the sons of "Hussain"⁴². The campaign was launched in April 1756, led by "Hassan Azraq", who was accompanied by the sons of Hussein bin Ali, and a large gathering of Algerian soldiers, the "Drid" and "Hanansha" tribes, and other Arabs who had joined them.

The campaign arrived to the fortress of "El Kef" on the 8th of Ramadan 1169 AH / June 6, 1756 AD, and the fighting continued between the two parties for several days. Despite the fierce resistance shown by the people of "El Kef", the army of "Zouaoua" and the "Makhzeniya", the Turkish-Tunisian army, fortified with fortresses and towers, did not fire a single bullet, and their cowardice became apparent due to the rift between them and "Ali Pasha", who mistreated them. They sided with the sons of "Hussain ibn Ali", and this hastened the fall of the city of "El Kef"⁴³.

The campaign then continued its march towards the capital, Tunis, and the fighting continued between the two sides throughout August, until the capital fell into the hands of "Hussain Azraq Aina" and Hussein's sons in September 1756. "Ali Pasha" and his son, "Muhammad Bey", were arrested, and the latter was killed by order of "Ali Bey", Hussein's son. As for "Ali Pasha", the Bey of Constantine imprisoned him for about a month.

News sources mention that when "Hassan Azraq Aina" had taken control of Tunis and seized its treasuries, he wrote to the Dey of Algiers seeking his advice on whether to annex "Toussen" to Algeria while he remained its ruler, or hand over the country to the sons of "Hussain ibn Ali" and return to Algeria. The Dey of Algiers, "Ali Bousbaa", ordered him to kill "Ali Pasha", hand the country over to "Muhammad ibn al-Hussain", and return to Algeria.

The Bey of Constantine began by killing "Ali Pasha" at the end of Dhu al-Hijjah 1169 AH (September 25, 1753 AD). He then handed over power to "Muhammad ibn Hussain ibn Ali", consolidated his power, and returned to Algeria on October 2 of the same year, laden with the money, ammunition, and gifts he had collected. Upon his arrival in Constantine, he died in late November 1756 AD, affected by an illness that had afflicted him⁴⁴.

The conclusion that can be drawn is that with the end of "Ali Pasha" and his son "Muhammad Bey" at the hands of the Algiers campaign in 1756 AD, the chapters of the civil war in Tunisia, which had ravaged everything for a long period of time, ended. Tunisia, its regions and its inhabitants were relieved from battles, seditions, and wars, and the political relations between the two states of Tunisia and Algeria entered a long period of peace and stability. Tunisia would not have reached this result and enjoyed calm had it not been for the intervention of the Algiers campaign, despite the losses and sacrifices it made in return for That.

This is in addition to the fact that the issue of imposing Algerian sovereignty and Tunisia's subordination to Algeria, which Tunisian sources mention in exchange for the assistance of the sons of "Hussain bin Ali" during this campaign, requires in-depth research. This is because when the Bey of Constantine wrote to the Dey of Algiers, "Ali Bousbaa", regarding the annexation of Tunisia to Algeria and his continued rule, he rejected this proposal. The Dey of Algiers responded by saying: "...the three vassals—Tunis, Algiers, and Tripoli—are Mamluks of the Sublime Ottoman Sultanate, and we are obedient to them. If this tax on money were valid in Islam, then the Sultan of the Muslims would be more deserving of it..."⁴⁵

CONCLUSION:

After this brief study of this important topic: **The Position of the Algerian Governors on the Tunisian Familial Dispute on the Authority between 1728-1756 A.D/ 117-1141 H**, I have concluded with a set of observations and suggestions:

- ❖ The Algerian rulers did not intervene in the first phase of the conflict (1728-1729 CE); they merely observed the developments from afar.
- ❖ Their actual intervention was in 1735 CE to support “Ali Pasha” against his uncle, “Hussain ibn Ali”. This intervention was at the request of “Ali Pasha” himself, and was not a coercive intervention by the Algerian rulers. This means that Tunisia's internal problems were ongoing, and even before this date, the conflicting parties there had been requesting military assistance from the Algerian rulers in exchange for a commitment to pay sums of money.
- ❖ The Algerian rulers' intervention again in 1756 CE to support the sons of “Hussain ibn Ali”, “Muhammad” and “Ali”, was also at the request of these sons. Despite the human and material losses resulting from this military campaign against both Tunisia and Algeria, it brought a definitive end to the civil war. Security and political stability were restored, and Tunisia entered an era of economic and social prosperity that lasted for half a century.
- ❖ The issue of imposing Algerian sovereignty over Tunisia and the subordination of its rulers to the rulers of Algeria, particularly after the 1756 campaign to support the sons of “Hussain ibn Ali” and the financial pledges and obligations they made, which continued to be paid during the second half of the 18th century, requires in-depth research into archival documents and Tunisian and Algerian tax records. This can then be confirmed or denied, as contemporary Tunisian and Algerian sources of the period have divergent positions on this issue.
- ❖ The role of border tribes, such as the “Hanansha”, the “Namansha”, and other border tribes, cannot be overlooked. The actions of their sheikhs played a major role in constantly fueling the fire of discord between the rulers of the two provinces, primarily based on their own interests. Furthermore, they did not maintain clear loyalty, but rather fluctuated in their allegiance between the two provinces' rulers and constantly evaded paying taxes. This, unfortunately, exacerbated the conflict and military campaigns between the two sisterly neighbors. This is another topic that also requires in-depth research by future researchers.
- ❖ The Sublime Porte's position on this conflict between its provinces in the western Mediterranean cannot be detailed in this research paper; it, too, requires separate research, based also on archival documents and correspondence between the Sublime Porte and its provinces of Algeria, Tunis, and Tripoli.
- ❖ The results of this civil war in Tunisia over power are divided into two parts: The negative consequences were due to the heavy human and material losses suffered, the destruction of numerous buildings and fortresses, and the impact on economic and social life resulting from the long conflict. The positive consequences were the stabilization of the internal political situation with the death of Ali Pasha following the Algerian campaign to support the sons of “Hussain ibn Ali”, “Muhammad” and “Ali”, in 1170 AH/1756 AD. Tunisia subsequently witnessed a long period of economic prosperity and commercial activity, and social life returned to its former glory. Trade flourished both internally and externally, housing and cities were inhabited, and the countryside and suburbs were cultivated. Cultural life also flourished, and schools and mosques were built, attracting students, especially during the reign of “Hamouda Pasha”, who succeeded his father, “Ali Bey”, as ruler of Tunisia between 1782 and 1814 AD.
- ❖ The results of this war on Algeria were costly in terms of equipping the repeated military campaigns, and there were human losses among the Algerian army after each intervention. However, these were often followed by financial and military spoils, including equipment and ammunition. The financial pledges that the victorious Tunisian side pledged to pay to the Algerian rulers in exchange for their assistance constituted a significant financial resource in times of need and crisis, especially after the decline in Algerian naval revenues. The most important conclusion that can be drawn is the freedom of the Algerian rulers to declare war or enter into peace without referring to the Sublime Porte. This demonstrates the political independence in making important military and military decisions that Algeria enjoyed during the reign of the Deys.

References

- ¹ The Husaynid dynasty ruled Tunisia after the end of the Muradid dynasty, and their rule continued from 1705 AD to 1956 AD in stages. After Tunisia's independence, hereditary rule was ended by Bourguiba and replaced by a republican one. On the circumstances of the establishment of the Husaynid rule in Tunisia, see: Ahmed Al-Saadawi, *Tunisia during the time of Hussein bin Ali and Ali Pasha 1755-1756 AD: Endowment Documents from the Husaynid Era*, 1st ed., Al-Atrash Complex for Specialized Books, Tunis, 2015, p. 13.
- ² He was born in 1675 AD to a father of Greek origin who came to Tunisia and worked in the military establishment. He married into two local tribes, as he married into the Shananf tribe and had a son, "Mohammad", then he married into the Sharn tribe and had his second son, Hussain, whom we are about to study. When Hussain grew up, he held several important positions that gave him political experience and shrewd management skills for ten years, during which he was close to the Muradid court and close to the wealthy and influential, and commander of the army, which qualified him to rule the country for more than thirty years. He died at the hands of Yunus, son of "Ali Pasha", the grandson of his brother "Mohammad", during the Pasha revolt in 1740 AD. See: Al-Wazir Al-Sarraj, *Al-Hilal Al-Sindiyya fi Al-Akhbar Al-Tunisiya*, edited by Muhammad Al-Hayla, Vol. 3, Dar Al-Gharb Al-Islami, Beirut, 1985, pp. 12-14.
- ³ The plural of 'mahalla' (محلة), which refers to a military detachment that was sent to rural areas during specific seasons to collect taxes from the populace."
- ⁴ Hamouda bin Abdul Aziz, *Al-Kitab Al-Bashi*, manuscript in the Tunisian National Archives, No. 15/900, page 103, 1.2.
- ⁵ The issue of the covenant is considered the main reason for this Pasha sedition because Hussain bin Ali, the founder of the Hussaini state, prepared his nephew Ali Pasha to succeed him because he had no children, and even when he had children, Ali Pasha remained the eldest of the sons within the family. Hussein bin Ali was the first to deviate from this rule, and this is what ignited this civil war. Therefore, the issue of inheritance to the throne was not established with a firm rule during the 18th century in Tunisia. Was it assigned to the eldest of the sons of the ruling Bey or to the eldest member of the Hussaini family. See: Muhammad Abd al-Aziz bin Ashur, "Political Institutions during the Husseinite State, 18th and 19th Centuries," *The Arab Historical Journal for Ottoman Studies*, No. 5/6, February 1992, Tunis, p. 14.
- ⁶ They are rugged, naturally fortified mountains inhabited by a group of resistant tribes. They are located to the south of the capital, Tunis. Hamouda bin Abdul Aziz describes them, saying: "They are the most fortified mountains in Africa, and the most populated and well-mannered, and their people are the quickest to cause strife and the most hypocritical." See: Hamouda bin Abdul Aziz, *Al-Kitab Al-Bashi*, Vol. 2, manuscript, pp. 105-1.
- ⁷ - Al-Saghir bin Youssef, *The Royal Legislator in the Sultanate of Awlad Ali Turki*, Vol. 2, edited by Ahmed Al-Tawili, Modern Press, Tunis, 2009, p. 82.
- ⁸ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 1, pp. 44-51.
- ⁹ During the year 1119 AH/1708 AD, Oran was liberated from the Spanish occupation during the reign of Dey Muhammad Bakdash, who ruled Algeria between 1707 and 1710 AD. For more information on the first conquest of Oran, see: Muhammad ibn Maimun al-Jaza'iri, *Al-Tuhafat al-Mardiya fi al-Dawla al-Bakdashiya fi Bilad al-Jaza'ir al-Muhtamirah*, ed. Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim, 2nd ed., National Company for Publishing and Distribution, Algeria, 1981, p. 121. Oran was then subjected to a second Spanish occupation in 1732 AD, which continued until its final liberation in 1791 AD.
- ¹⁰ About this Dey and his efforts to reclaim Oran and his death from grief over its occupation in 1732 AD, see: Ahmed Tawfiq Al-Madani, *The Three Hundred Years' War between Algeria and Spain 1492-1792*, Dar Al-Basaer, Algeria, 2007, pp. 443-448.
- ¹¹ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 1, pp. 286-287.
- ¹² It is an old Mexican currency, and was commonly used in the city of Annaba and the ports of eastern Algeria, and is considered a main currency in commercial transactions, especially with foreigners. Its weight in Kala was equal to 18 fils and 16 grains, and in Annaba 16 fils and 19 grains, and in Kala 16 fils and 6 grains. The piaster was called in Annaba the Annabi riyal, which is a full riyal, but it is specific to Annaba only. See: Al-Aribi Asmahan, *Foreign Trade of the City of Annaba during the*

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- Ottoman Era (18th century) (through primary sources), *Journal of Human Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2012, p. 76.
- ¹³ Al-Saghir bin Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 2, p. 81.
- ¹⁴ Hamouda ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Kitab Al-Bashi, manuscript, page 111-1.
- ¹⁵ The alliance with these sheikhs was considered a guarantee of the loyalty of their tribes, which constituted the largest and most powerful tribes of the eastern Algerian beylik, especially the Hanancha and the Nmamcha. On these alliances, see: Amar Ben Kharrouf, *Political Relations between Algeria and Tunisia in the 18th Century AD/12th Century AH*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Amal, Tizi Ouzou (Algeria), 2017, pp. 95-96.
- ¹⁶ Hamouda ibn Abdul Aziz, Al-Kitab Al-Bashi, manuscript, page 110-2.
- ¹⁷ He was one of Ali Pasha's sons and helped his father in his war against his uncle, Hussein ibn Ali, killing him in Kairouan in 1740. When power was firmly established in his father's favor, he revolted against him in Jumada al-Thani 1165 AH/April 1752 AD. He besieged Tunis for fifty-five days and waged war against his two brothers, Princes Muhammad and Sulayman, who had supported their father. When his revolt failed, he fled to Tebessa and then Constantine, where he was imprisoned by its governor by order of the Dey of Algiers until his death in 1768 AD. See: Alphonse Rousseau, *Tunisian Annals from the Arab Conquest until the French Occupation of Algeria*, trans. Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Wafi, 1st ed., Publications of Garyounis University, Benghazi, 1992, pp. 204-208.
- Al-Saghir ibn Yusuf, the previous source, vol. 1, p. 305.
- ¹⁸ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 1, p. 305.
- ¹⁹ The Tunisian rial (silver coin) is worth approximately 0.5 French francs, while the Algerian rial (silver coin) is worth approximately 1.8 French francs. See Amar Ben Kharrouf, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
- ²⁰ Ammar ibn Kharouf, the previous reference, pp. 104-107.
- ²¹ It was called "the False Algerian Expedition" because it did not reach the capital, Tunis, and stopped at the border city of El Kef, then returned to Algeria without succeeding in its mission, and was therefore considered false.
- ²² Ibn Kharouf, previous reference, p. 137.
- ²³ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 3, p. 102.
- ²⁴ Ibn Abdul Aziz, Al-Tarikh Al-Bashi, manuscript, page 136-1.
- ²⁵ Ibn Kharouf, previous reference, p. 127
- ²⁶ The Zouaoua soldiers are of Algerian origin and became part of the permanent military units of the Tunisian army after their training. Their presence in the Tunisian army and their use in military units dates back to the Hafsid era. The Muradid and Husaynid beys also used them in their wars. For the history of this army and how it was recruited and used in the Tunisian wars, see: Ibn al-Mufti, *Rajab Shaoush Hussein, Ibn al-Mufti's Restrictions on the History of the Pashas of Algeria and its Scholars*, compiled by Faris Kawan, Bayt al-Hikma, Algiers, 2008, p. 73.
- ²⁷ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 2, p. 228.
- ²⁸ Ahmed Al-Sharif Al-Zahar, *Memoirs of Hajj Ahmed Al-Sharif Al-Zahar, Chief of the Ashrafs of Algeria, 1168-1246 AH/1754-1830 AD*, edited by Ahmed Tawfiq Al-Madani, National Company for Publishing and Distribution, Algeria, 1974, p. 17
- ²⁹ Hamouda ibn Abdul Aziz, Al-Kitab Al-Bashi, (manuscript) page 136-1.2, and page 138-1.
- ³⁰ The Sabaihiyya are military groups whose mission is to maintain security and secure roads. See: Rashad Al-Imam, *The Policy of Hamouda Pasha in Tunisia (1782-1814)*, Tunisian University Publications, Tunis 1980, p. 55.
- ³¹ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 3, pp. 102-106.
- ³² Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 4, p. 5
- ³³ It is one of the most important Algerian tribes that contributed to stirring up sedition and conflicts between the Algerian and Tunisian Regencies. It settled in the border areas and is divided into two branches: the A'shāsh, who were supporters of Bey Husain and his sons, and the Awlād Khiyār, who were supporters of 'Ali Pasha. They were subject to a tax on their sheep, which they paid to the ruler of Tunis in exchange for being allowed to trade in the Djerid region and other markets. However, they withheld it from him for several years. See: Ibn Abi al-Diyaf, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 132.
- ³⁴ Hamouda ibn Abdul Aziz, Al-Tarikh Al-Bashi (manuscript), pp. 146-1 and 2.
- ³⁵ Ibn Kharrouf, the previous reference, p. 150.

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- ³⁶ Ibn Abi Al-Dhiaf, previous source, Vol. 2, p. 147.
- ³⁷ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 4, pp. 12-16.
- ³⁸ Regarding this Dey and his nephew Hassan Arq Ayneh, the circumstances of their rise to power, and the reason for the enmity that brought them together with Ali Yasha, the ruler of Tunis, see: Al-Sharif Al-Zahar, the previous source, pp. 16-20.
- ³⁹ Ibn Kharrouf, the previous reference, p. 147.
- ⁴⁰ Hamouda ibn Abdul Aziz, the previous source, (manuscript), page 147-2.
- ⁴¹ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 4, p. 11.
- ⁴² - Ahmed Al-Sharif Al-Zahar, the previous source, pp. 15-17.
- ⁴³ Al-Saghir ibn Youssef, the previous source, Vol. 4, pp. 40-41.
- ⁴⁴ Ibn Abi Al-Dhiaf, the previous source, Vol. 2, pp. 150-153.
- ⁴⁵ Ibn Abi Al-Dhiaf, the previous source, Vol. 2, pp. 153-154.

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